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ABSTRACT 
The study examines the land size-productivity relationship and profitability among owner 
operated and share cropper operated farms growing soybean during the 1999 rainy season 
in three villages of Vidisha District of Madhya Pradesh. The land size-productivity 
relationship has been found inverse both for owner operated farms(-0.27) and share 
cropper operated farms(-0.30). The Productivity of Owner operated farms is nlarginally 
higher at 0.72 t ha" compared to 0.68 t ha.' in share cropper operated farms, among 
lCRISAT trial farmers the yield is higher at 1.I t ha''. The average profit per hectare is 
also higher at Rs.2045 per hectare in comparison to Rs. 1773 in share cropper operated 
farms.The exploitative nature of the share cropping contracts(20:80 ratio and 33:66) 
ratio) is documented. The policy implications are analysed, and intervention strategies are 
recommended to the stakeholders to facilitate equitable develop~nent arnong farmers and 
share croppers. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 LAND AND DEVELOPMENT IN LNDLA 
The ilnportance of a well defined n~ral development strategy in the overall 
strategy of growth and development can never be overstated. The analysis of the 
national income statistics reveals that the share of agriculture in the Net Domestic 
Product has fallen from 54% in 193 1 to only 28% in 1993-1994, with a marginal 
decline in the population ensaged in agriculture from 71% to 65% (See Table No. 1). 
The worsening terms of trade of agriculture vis-a-vis the industrial and tertiary 
structure has meant that the growing population has been left worse off than before 
with more people having lesser incomes. A recent study by Suryanarayana (2000a, 
2000b) argues that the present ~nethodology for calculating the poverty ratios 
underestimate the true extent of poverty and his calculation reveals that the people 
living below the poverty line are 75% of rural India and 54% of urban India. The 
study makes the failure of the Indian planniny process look even more startling and 
throws up fresh challenges to the policy makers. 
Table 1 .  I :  Share of Agriculture in  National Income and Workforce, 1931-1994 
Source: Shah (1998-43) citirly Bhaduri (1993). EPW Research Foundation (1995) 
Planning Commission ( 1997). 
The development strategy in the post-independence period has had major 
interventions froin the Government and include, The 'Big Push' strategy of 
industrialization within a mixed economy framework, the launching of the Intensive 
Agricultural Development Programme, "Green Revolution" in the 1960s. Land and 
Tenancy reforms and the launching of various direct poverty alleviation schemes. The 
evolvement of the Planning process in the initial years has been documented by 
Chakravarty (1987). The articulation of a strategy for Land Reforms was made in the 
Second Five Year Plan Document which included a chapter on "Land and Reform and 
Agrarian Reorganization" which enunciated a strategy for land reform which would 
form the basis of a more progressive agrarian structure. It was hoped that this would 
increase agricultural output and among many people, Nehru regarded cooperative 
farming as an ultimate solution. It was believed that the programme of community 
development and national extension would constitute an essential catalyst in this 
process, along with irrigation. 
The Planners in the Second and Third Five Year Plan believed that in the early 
stages of industrialization it was necessary for agriculture to contribute to the building 
up of a modern industrial sector by providing cheap labour and also cheap food. It 
was argued this would help in maintaining a low wage in the industrial sector (Hayek, 
1975). The monsoon failures in  1965 and 1967 lead to catastrophic decline in food 
production and to overcome the agricultural stagnation, the Green Revolution strategy 
was adopted in 1969. Elaborating on the shift in strategy, Chakravarty articulates 
"Earlier theorizing had maintained that , . . . .  it was basically the absence of 
knowledge, of appropriate agricultural practice along with the maintenance of 
an obsolete social structure, which prevented increase in agricultural 
production. Land refor111 was considered very important, at least in principle, 
in practice the issue was largely evaded. The new strategy seemed to deny the 
critical importance of the issue even on the level of principle. Instead, 
emphasis was shifted to technology modernization. It was also openly 
admitted that it was essential to bet on the strong" (Chakravarty, 1987, P. 27). 
It was largely agreed that despite the largest body of land reform legislation 
being passed in a short period of time (See Thorner, 1976). the major problem has 
been the unenthusiastic implementation of the legislation and political scientists have 
argued that the Congress party which has been in power for most of the time in this 
period, consisted of politicians and Ministers from the Land owning classes who were 
not sympathetic to the interest of the landless and small farmers. 
Despite the above problems, a recent study by Besley and Burgess (2000) 
which uses state level data for sixteen main states from 1958 to 1992 finds that land 
reforms have led to poverty reduction in India and according to the study: 
"Our main finding is that there is a robust link between land reform and 
poverty reduction. Closer scrutiny reveals. that, in an Indian context. this is 
due primarily to land reforms that challenge the terms of land contracts rather 
than redistributing land" (ihid, P. 39). 
1.2 LAND REFORM LEGISLATION 
The Land Reform Acts can be classified into four main categories according to 
their purpose (Mearns, 1988). The first category is related to tenancy reform which 
attempted to resulate tenancy contracts both via registration and stipulation of 
contractual terms, such as shares in share tenancy contacts, as well as to abolish 
tenancy and transfer ownership to tenants. The second category has attempted to 
abolish intermediaries who worked under feudal lords (zamindars). The Third 
category was acts which attempted to implement ceiling on land holdings and finally 
there were acts that attempted to allow consolidation of disparate land holding. 
"A broad assessment of the programme of land reform adopted since 
independence is that the laws for the abolition of intermediary tenures have 
been implemented fairly efticiently while in the fields of tenancy reforms and 
ceilings on holdings, legislation has fallen short of the desired objective, and 
implementation of the enacted laws have been inadequate" (Fifth Five Year 
Plan, 1974-79, p.2). 
Tenancy reform have succeeded where tenants are well organized. in other 
cases there have been large scale cases of mass eviction of tenants md the de- 
jure banning of landlord-tenant relationships pushing underground and 
paradoxically reducing tenurial security. The role of political will and the need 
for mass mobilization is emphasized in the studies of the experience in Kerala 
and West Bengal. Oomen and Dasgupta explain that- 
"Unless land reforms are backed up by mass mobilization with a government 
sympathetic to the working class both at the state and at the centre, they 
cannot succeed. This is an important lesson to be drawn from the experience 
of Kerala. (Oomen, 1990, p.3 1). 
"The political will of government while the most crucial factor, would not by 
itself bring about a radical change in land relations without organized 
mobilization and active participation of the intended beneficiaries in the 
programme" (Dasgupta, 1982, p. 18). 
The intervention in Madhya Pradesh in terms of legislation enactment is as follows: 
1974 - Agricultural Workers Act - Called for Employment Security, fixed 
hours, minimum wages. 
1950 - Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estate, Mahals. Alienated Lands) Act - 
Abolition of intermediaries. 
195 1 - United States of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa Zamindari Abolition Act - 
Abolition of Intermediaries. 
195 1 - Abolition of Jagir Act - Abolition of Intermediaries. 
1952 - Madhya Pradesh - Abolition of Jagir Act - Abolition of Intermediaries. 
1959 - Land Revenue Code - Leasing Prohibited, entitles occupancy rights to 
ownership rights of non resumable area on payment of 15 times the land 
revenue; Implementation of reform inefficient, one reason being that 
sharecroppers and tenants were not recorded. 
1959 - Consolidation of Land Holdings Act - Introduction of compulsory 
consolidation. 
1960 - Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings Act - Imposed ceiling on 
landholdings of 10, I2 hectares (1 960- 1972) and 4.05-2 1.85 hectares (after 
1972. 
Source: Besley and Burgess 2000, pp. 398-399. 
The assessment by Besley and Burgess (2000) of the implementation in 
Madhya Pradesh has been that although leasing has been prohibited by the 1959 Law 
Revenue code and the law entitles occupancy rights of non resumable area on 
payment of 15 times the land revenue, "implementation of reform (is) inefficient, one 
reason being the share croppers and tenants are not recorded" (P. 399). 
The Government of Mndhya Pradesli in  its I998 Human Development Report 
(P.249) does recognise the existence of share cropping. In Vidisha District, only 
1.7% of land holding is reported to be self operated with 79.4% being leased-in. The 
term 'other wise' possibly refers to illegal cultivation that is undertaken in the common 
and governlnent land. 
The land ownership in the district according to the report is as follows. 
Table 1.2: Land Holding in Vidisha District 
Source: MPHDR, 1998 citing Directorate of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 
1990-9 1 and 1993-94, Co~nmissioner of Land Records. 
Wholly owned and self 
operated holdings 
Number 
1.7% 
Area 
0.9% 
Wholly leased in holdings Wholly otherwise operated 
holdings 
Nu~tiber 
79.4% 
Number 
18.6% 
Area 
63.1% 
Area 
3 1.2% 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study are - 
(i) To study the relationship between land Size and productivity among 
owner operated farms and share cropper operated farms. 
(ii) To examine the profitability for owner operated farmers, landlords and 
share croppers. 
(iii) To recommend policy interventions for the Madhya Pradesh 
Government and intervention strategies for the stakeholders, 
International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics(1CRISAT) 
and the NGO, Bharatiya Agro Industries foundation(BA1F) in 
promoting equitable development among the farmers and share 
croppers. 
1.4 STUDY AREA 
The data was collected from Lateri Watershed in Lateri block of Vidisha 
District, Madhya Pradesh. The stakeholders involved are BAIF as the implementing 
agency with funding support from the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission and 
ICRISAT, which provides technical support and is conducting trials for promotion of 
improved watershed management practices. The villages selected for the study were 
Jaoti. Kherkhedi and Kundhankhedi and Lalatora in Lateri Block of Vidisha District. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
Primary Data were collected fro~n the above villages using an Interview 
Schedule. Owner operated farmers and the Share Croppers were interviewed. The 
data were collected in the first fortnight of October 2000 and a repeat visit was made 
in the last week of November 2000. The data on trial farmers (owner operated farms) 
from Lalatora was collected by the Agriculture Of'ticer, Lateri. Watershed Data has 
been analysed by using the correlation technique to understand the relationship 
between various variables. The selection of the villages was through purposive 
sampling to enable the sample to contain both owner operated farmers and share 
croppers who ci~ltivate soybean. The selection of the respondents was done through 
random sampling. 
The sample for the study was as follows: 
Table 1.3: Details of Sample for the Study 
In addition to the above data, infor~nation on the Crop yields from 12 ICRISAT Trial 
farmers (owner operated firms) in Lalotora was used for a comparative analysis 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
Total 
3 8 
2 5 
13 
76 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kund hank hed i 
Total 
The First Chapter introdiices the thesis topic. The Second Chapter reviews the 
literature on land Size - Productivity relationship and Share cropping in 1ndia.The 
Third Chapter discusses Soybean I'roduction and Productivity in India. The Fourth 
Chapter introduces the Sti~dy Area. The Fifrh Chapter discusses the relationship 
between Land Size and Productivity and profitability among owner-operated farms 
and the Sixth Chapter discusses it among Share Croppers. The Seventh and last 
Chapter sum~narizes and recorn~nends the possible policy interventions and 
intervention strategies for the stakeholders. 
Owner Operated Farms 
18 
12 
9 
3 9 
Share Croppers 
2 0 
13 
4 
37 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW O F  LITERATURE 
2.1 LAND SIZE - PRODUCTIVIT\' RELATIONSHIP 
The discussion on the inverse relationship between land size and productivity 
in agriculture could be traced back to the work of Chaynov(1966) who examined data 
for Russian Agriculture for the 1920's and 1930's In India the identification of this 
relationship came after tlle analysis of the data on Farm Management Studies (FMS) 
in the mid 1950's (See Bhardwaj, 1974, Saini, I 969 and Bhagwathi and Chakravarthy, 
1969). It was observed that small farms, on average employed more input per acre and 
as a result had a higher o~~tpu t  per acre. Sen (1962) initiated the debate by providing 
evidence of the inverse relationship based on FMS data and he observed that if the 
market wage rate is imputed to fn~nily labour many of the farms show losses and 
profitability increases with the size of the holdings. 
Sen (1966, 1975) provides an explanation in his theory of 'agricultural 
dualism' where the traditional s~nall peasant is assumed to be endowed with plentifbl 
labour with low or zero opportunity cost while facing a severe constraint on credit. 
These farms w o ~ ~ l d  employ labour upto to the point of zero marginal productivity. 
Large farms, however would employ labour upto to the point where the wage rate 
equaled the marginal product. As a consequence the peasant sector will apply more 
labour per acre than the capitalists. This can explain declining productivity in terms of 
output per acre but increasing profitability. Srinivasan ( 1  973) agues that if farmers are 
maximising the expected utility of their income (and if they are risk averse), then it is 
optimal for small farms to employ more inputs per hectare. 
There were however other studies in the 1960's which provided evidence that 
inverse relationship might be weak, if not existent (Rao, 1967, Rudra 1968). Rudra's 
study analysing individual holdings in 20 villages noted that in 18 villages, the data 
failed to reveal any dependence of yield per acre on farm size while in the GW of one 
there was in fact a positive relationship and the remaining one revealed no systematic 
pattern. Bhardwilj's (1974) study using the FMS data hypothesis& that th inverse 
relationship could have arisen on account of ayyregation where data were presented as 
size group averages whereas in the above two studies, disaggregated data at the 
individual level was used. However later studies by Saini (1971) and Bhattacharya 
and Saini (1972) provided support for the hypothesis of the inverse relation. 
Saini (1971) analysed 25 sets of disaygregated farm level data from nine states 
and in 18 of the data sets the inverse relationship was found to be true. Bhattacharya 
and Saini (1972) analysed data from sample villages in Muzzafarnagar in Uttar 
Pradesh and Ferozepur in Punjab and on the whole they confirmed the inverse 
relationship between size and productivity for Muzzafarnagar, but found the situation 
for Ferozepur relatively c~nclear. Sen's ( 198 1 ) study of sample village from West 
Bengal uses the value of oi~tpi~t per acre as a measure of productivity and establishes 
the existence of a negative relationship between productivity and farm size in owner 
operated farms. In  owner operated farms that have leased-in land the trend is not 
clear. The very s~nallest farms have the lowest productivity, but among the remaining 
classes of farms, productivity continues to decline with size. In the share cropped land 
in every size class, the productivity per acre on share cropped land is lower than the 
productivity of the same farms i111der owner cultivation. 
The inverse relationship appears at an aggregate level as well, even when the 
differences between the owner occupied and tenant land is not taken into account. 
Cline's study (1979) based on data from India (as a whole), Northeast Brazil, Punjab 
(Pakistan) and Muda in Malaysia suppo~ts the decreasing farm size relationship. 
Regardless of the form of operation, size plays an important role. The study suggests 
that larger the size ditferences, larger are the productivity differences. In North East 
Brazil, the s~nall farms are over five times as productive as compared to the largest 
farms while the ratio narrows down to 1.5 times to Muda, Malaysia. Thus, as 
Binswanger, et.al (1995) have noted, there is greater support for the hypothesis those 
regions of greater ineqi~ality have proportior~ately more to gain under an efficiency 
view point alone from land reform. 
The under investment of inputs, particularly as land size increases h v e  been 
examined extensively in the literature. The transaction costs of investment are higher 
for small farmers as credit markets are imperfect and loans are usually available only 
with land as collateral or at exorbitant interest rates from moneylenders. If this is the 
case, which often is. the bigger farmers who have better access to the institutional 
credit market should be investing inputs accordiny to scale but the evidence from 
empirical literature is contrary to that. The reason for the under-investment is due to 
the risk-averse beliaviour and Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1 993). The study(using 
ICRlSAT data) provides evidence that the variability of monsoon is a significant 
variable. The study shows due to variability in the monsoons. the wealthier farmers 
are more likely to undertake riskier investments due to their ex-post consumption 
smoothing mechanisms, whereas poorer farmers would not take that risk, even if they 
would have to be satisfied with lower but stable incomes. 
Studies have noted that adjustment for land quality diminishes the inverse 
relationship (Khusro, 1964, Sen, 1975, Bliss and Stern, 1982). It is argued that the 
inverse relationship is a spurioirs result caused by the bias due to the omission of land 
quality in regressions (Bl~alla and Roy, 1988). The role of distress sale in transferring 
poor quality land from small firmer-s to bigger farmers has been noted by Bhagwathi 
and Chakravarty (1969) The enipirical evidence on the inverse relationship 
predominantly supports the existence of the inverse relationship. Dissenting 
arguments based on the evidence of' the clilality of land have been important 
contributions that have questioned this relationship. 
2.2 SHARE CROPPING AND PRODIJCTIVITY 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics defines share cropping as thus 
"Share Croppiny is a form of land tenancy in  which the landlord allows the 
tenant to use his land in return for a stipulated fraction of the output". 
The land tenure arrangements in India have evolved under the Mughal rule in 
the 17' and 18 centuries. British rule in  the 19"' and 20Ih centuries and the practice of 
Share Cropping can be traced back at least to as far as the Mughal period. In Europe 
Adam Smith (1 776) believed that the tnetayers (share croppers) of France were the 
successor of the Slave Cultivators of ancient times. Commenting on the metayers 
system in France Arthur Young who was the secretary to the Board of Agriculture in 
England said that 
"There is not one word to be said in favour of the practice, and a thousand 
arguments that might be used against i t . .  . In this most miserable of all the 
modes of letting land, the defrauded landlord receives a contemptible rent; the 
farmer is in the lowest state of poverty; the land is miserably cultivated; and 
the nation suffers as severely as the parties themselves . . .  Wherever this 
system prevails, it may be taken for granted that a useless and miserable 
popirlation is found" (Edwards. 1892. pp. 202-203). 
The etficiency of Share Cropping has been a long debated issue and one of the 
earliest advocates of the inefticiency hypothesis was Adam Smith. He argued that it 
was not in the interest of the share croppers in improving productivity of the land as 
he got only one tenth of the product (Smith, 1776-367). The 'slave' cultivators 
preceding the metayers were succeeded the 'slaves' and 'by very slow degrees' the 
metayers were succeeded by farmers.. . who cultivated the land with their own stock, 
paying a certain rent to the landlord" (ihid 368). Smith favoured fixed-rent contracts 
and was concerned with the insecurity of the farmers because of the expiration of the 
lease. He advocated "the law which secures the longest leases against successors of 
every kind" (ihid-369) I t  was also criticised by important English classical 
economists. 
Marshall ( 1956) argued that Share Cropping lead to a Pareto-inefficient 
allocation of labour. Marshall stirdied the problem from the view point of a share 
tenant who can share crop at a stipi~lated rate of rental and the share cropper land can 
allocate his labour between the share cropped land and outside at an exogenously 
fixed wage rate. The rental share paid to the landlord was tantamount to an excise tax 
on the share crupper's effort and this would induce the share cropper to reduce his 
output below the wage level where the marginal product of the share cropping is equal 
to the wage level. This i~nder provision of inputs by the share cropper (or labour by 
the wage labourers is characterized as "Marshallian inefficiency" in subsequent 
literature. 
Johnson (1950) provided three sol~~tiorls to the inefficiency problem - first to 
enforce the desired level of cultivation by the tenant, second to insist on shorter term 
leases which would enable the landlord to make periodic review of the performance 
of the Tenant and thirdly to split the expenses of cultivation in the same proportions 
as the rental rations thus making the tenant's 'internal' price of an input equal to its 
'external' price. 
The Marshallian tradition was built on the implicit assumption that the share 
contract refer to only one variable, however as pointed to by Johnson and 
subsequently by Cheung, a contract need not contain only one variable. Cheung 
(1969) argues that Inany real world contracts (drawing evidence from Taiwan) specify 
such items as the amount of land to be cultivated, non labour inputs to be supplied. 
etc., in addition to the rental share The argument is as follows: if the labour-intensity 
of the share cropped land is less than under wage cultivation, the landlord can earn 
higher rental income either by self cultivation (through hired labour) or by fixed rental 
tenancy. On the other hand, if the landlord insists on a higher labour intensity on the 
share cropped land there would not be any tenant available for share cropping. 
Therefore the optimum would recli~ire the labour-intensity on the share cropped land 
should be such that the marginal product of labour is equal to the wage level and the 
rent per unit is equal to the marginal 131-oduct 
This idealistic and artificial analysis has been critiqued. Jaynes (1982) has 
rightly argued that 
"The tenant representation in  this process is superfluous. Tenants make no real 
choices as to labour supply, but simply choose the various all or nothing offers 
made i~nilaterally by landlords.. . The role of wage in Cheung's analysis is just 
to ensure efficiency. The model is adhoc". 
Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971) were the first to extend the conventional 
unilateral maximisation approach to a general equilibrium approach. They allow both 
the landlord and the tenant to influence in determination of the share rental while 
retaining the perfectly competitive laboi~r market assumption of Cheung and Marshal. 
The share-tenant in the model has the option of leasing in land to cultivate with his 
own labour or working as a wage labo~~r  in some alternative employment. tenant 
is assumed to maximize his i~tility in terms of income and leisure. On the supply side. 
the landlord has the option of cultivating his own land or renting it out to the share 
cropper. The landlord like the tenant is asst~~ned to maximize his utility, which is 
defined in terms of income and leisure. Combining tlie demand and supply functions 
so derived they yo on to determine the competitive share-rental rate. 
Bhaduri's (1973) contribution has been a significant one in which he shows 
that a landlord who is a provider of consumption loans to his tenant may have no 
incentive to adopt yield-increasing innovations, if the landlord's interest from his 
loans to the tenant does not go down (because the tenant will borrow less as he shares 
the increased yield). This proposition has been criticised by Ghose and Saith (1976). 
Newberry ( 1974) Sri~iivasan ( 1979) and others that it is a weak constraint on adoption 
of technical progress and it is argued that if the landlord has sufficient power to 
exploit his tenant-borrower and to withhold the innovation, then he ought to have 
sufficient power to gain from the innovation. 
Bell and Bravernian (1981) show that an income maximising land lord will 
always prefer to self-cultivate rather tlian employ a share cropper (to escape from 
Marshallian inefficiency). A moditication of the Marshallian tradition is provided by 
Lucas (1979) presents a joint uptiniising system which is differentiated from others by 
the feature that wage labour requires monitoring in order to extract full effort. 
Landlords may prefer share tenancy contracts because under that workers have an 
incentive to work hardener even without supervision. The costs are the monitoring 
costs for the landlord and for the tenant i t  is the share tax on the extra output 
produced. He finds that mixed wase and sliare tenancy contracts along with share 
tenancy contracts provides higher social welfare than a wage only contract. 
The most coinmoll answer given for the existence of share cropping is the 
existence of ayrici~ltural risk It is seen as a risk between the landlord and the tenant 
(Newberry. 1979) has developed an appruacli drawing on insights from the capital 
market. Each leasing agreement (share c~.opping or renting) or self-cultivation is 
viewed as an asset with specific risk and return characteristics. The landlord's problem 
is to allocate his land between tlie assets is such a way as to maximize his expected 
income. The resi~lt from their analysis is that incorporating uncertainty provides 
scarcely any rationale for share cropping. I t  is argued that the mixture of rental and 
wage agreements provides exactly the same income as share cropping. 
Determination of Rental Share Resource Allocation and Distribution of Income 
Bardhan and Srinivas (1971) developed a scheme of analysis wherein the 
rental share is regarded by the parties of the contract 'as a price-like variable', i.e, it is 
parametrically given to all agents. For an exogenously given real wage rate, the 
supply of and demand for leases determine the rental share. A second approach 
formulated by Cheung and extended by Nrwberry (1973), in  which both the rental 
share and the minimum labour per uni t  of land are stipulated in all contracts, their 
values being jointly determined by the landlord's desire to maximise his income 
subject to the conditions that the tenant's income does not fall below his alternative 
earnings in  a perfectly competitive labour market. 
2.2.1 Role r . f  Te~irrncy in 1lrrl)erf:fi.c.t Ri~rrrl Mrrrkets 
a. Tenancv as a Mechanism for Kesource Adii~st~nent 
Tenancy is a contractual system that enables rural households to adjust their 
resources, particularly larid i n  relation to their endowment labour and draft power. 
Thus rural hoirseliolds niay find that they are better of in leasing land than seeking 
wage elnploylnent given the limited and uncertain job opportunities in rural areas. 
Conversely where labour is scarce, especially during peak seasons, landowners may 
prefer to lease out land rather than depend on an i~ncertain supply of lahour. 
b. Tenancv and Incentives 
The argument that tenants have a greater incentive to work than wage 
labourers is rooted in classical economics in the writings of Adam Smith. J.S. Mill 
and Marshall. Smith argi~ed that in Europe share-tenancy succeeded serfdom which 
itself gave way to fixed rent tenancy. 
c. Tenancv as a Credit Svsteni 
In developing cotrntries like India where markets for capital and credit are 
underdeveloped, tlie only way a person lntty have of gaining access to these resources 
is to enter into a tenancy contract. This is one of the main incentives in rural India 
where consulnption loans and provision of goods in kind is strong incentive. 
Braverman and Stiglitz (1980) have argued that there are good reasons for this 
arrangement as i t  both lowers tlte cost of credit to the tenant and enables the landlord 
to monitor the tenant's effort. Landlords also provide credit to the tenants by 
supplying them inputs, with the tenant's contractiral share of the costs being subtracted 
from his share of the output after the harvest. 
d. Tenancv. Risk and Eritrenreriei~& 
Agric~~ltural production anci its returns are risky and have an important bearing 
on the contractual system and i n  t u r ~ i  tlie co~it~xctual system has a differential effect 
on the landlord and the share cropper. Clieung (1969) was the first to put forward the 
hypothesis tliat the choice between different forms of land tenure arrangements was 
likely to be aft'ected by the parties risk aversion under uncertainty. 
Tenancy contracts do provide an incentive for effective realization of the 
entrepreneurial abilities provided the contractilal terms are favourable. Rao (1971) 
noted that share cropping seemed more prevalent in India where crops provided little 
scope for decision making by tenants, whereas fixed rent contracts were most often 
needed when Inore decision making was required. Rao found froin his data in South 
India that share cropping dolninated rice producing areas with assured irrigation, 
while fixed rents prevailed in tobacco growing areas In the tobacco growing areas the 
small holders tended to lease o i~t  o large lioltlers Newberry (1975) suggested that 
fixed rent contracts might be preferred for crops requiriny entrepreneurial skills where 
(i) landlords were more risk averse tlian the tenants, or 
(ii) tenants had special skills tliat they did not wish to share with landlords, 
(iii) landlords faced the problem of 'moral hazard' - that they could not determine 
whether shortfalls in output were the tenant's fault. 
Tenancv and Transaction Costs 
The Transaction costs depend on the nature of the contract. Cheung (1969) 
argued that these costs were higher u~rder sliarecropping than fixed wage or fixed 
rental arrangements. 
Datta (1980) points out that as long as there is an imbalance between 
ownership of land and labour, some form of tenancy lnilst result. Each form involves 
some 'inefficiency' produced by the transaction costs of enforcing and monitoring the 
contract. 
"When laboi~r is hired at a tixed wage rate, labour shrinks in  both quantitative 
and qi~alitative terms When land is leased-out at a fixed rent the tenant has 
little direct incentive to maintain tlie soil fertility, irrigation facilities and other 
durable assets attached to land On a share contract where the tenant receives a 
share of the total output, both problems are present, but each in a lesser degree 
than under fixed payment contract The degree and character of monitoring 
however vary across contract types from continuous and detailed in the case of 
fixed wage contracts wllere tlie lalidowner works alongside the labourer, to 
infrequent arid 'after-the-t'act' for many fixed rent contract" (P. 70). 
Tenancv. Itldivisibilitv and Econonlies of Scale 
There are Inany indivisibilities in farming, an important example is the 
availability of draft power, in the form ofa  pair of bullocks. Since the rental market in 
draft animals is poorly developed, those with some land but without draft power may 
decide to lease out land to others \vho posses draft power. Small farmers who own 
very little land may find that the best way they can use their indivisible input of draft 
power is to rent in additional land. Uisecono~nies of scale are also a reason for the 
prevalence of tenancy O w ~ l a s  will otten lease out distant plots and lease in 
conveniently located ones, owners with dry land would lease in Irrigated land to be 
grown in the rainy season 
Specification of Inputs 
Share Cropping is deemed to be inet'ficient because under the terms of a share 
contract, the tenant has insut'ficient incentive to opti~nise the use of the resources on 
the share cropped land Kudra ( 1975) and Bhardwaj and Das (1975) report that tenants 
in West Bengal and Orissa made lnost decisions about cultivation, in  other areas 
especially once HYVs are introduced share contracts often involve agreements on the 
inputs to be ilsed, their rli~antities and the cropping pattern. Parthasarthy and Prasad 
(1978) noted that i n  West (jodnvri i n  Atldlil~a I'radesh, when modern varieties of rice 
were introduce decision making shifted to a great extent on the landlord. Bardhan and 
Rudra (1980) report similar resi~lts 
Cost Sharing 
There is no systematic data on cost sharing arrangements, however a large 
number of studies from South Asia suggest that cost sharing is more common. In 
particular landlords hilve been increasing1 y shari~lg in the costs of inputs like 
fertilisers, pesticides. HYV seeds, land tax and irrigation charges in proportion to their 
share of inputs. Vyas (1979) reported that in Gijarat in  the 1950s, tenants supplied 
family labour. bullocks, itnple~nents and seeds while all other costs were equally 
shared. Rudra ( 1975) reported from West Bengal that cost of labour, bullock and 
plows were the responsibility of the tenant, irrigation costs were borne by the landlord 
while seed and fertilizer costs were share equally. Jodha (1979) reported wide 
variations in input and output shares in the semi-arid regions of Maharashtra and 
Andhra Pradesh, a tenant's share in input and output was normally 50% but latter 
could rise to as much as 75% it' mid-season difficulties increased the cost of 
cultivation. Most of the studies report the 50-50 ratio in cost of cultivation and output 
shares. 
The evidence is mixed regarding tlle etliciency of share cropping. The studies 
that conclude that the behaviour of share croppers is basically not different from that 
of owners incli~de Rao ( 1971) with evidence from Andhra Pradesh, Chakravarty and 
Rudra (1973) with evidence tium five Indian districts. Dwiedi and Rudra (1973) with 
data from Wet Bengal The fbl lowing studies have reported the Marshallian 
proposition of higiler inpu t  and ui~tput intensities per unit on owned relative to share 
cropped land - Bell ( 1977) with data ti-om North of India, Chattapodhay ( I  979) from 
West Bengal, Shahban (1987) with evidence from 8 districts in India and Deininger 
and Feeder ( 1993). Bliss and Stern's ( 1982) intensive study in Palanpur, Uttar Pradesh 
have reported  nixed evidence 
Parthasarty and Prasnd (1074) in  a micro level study found no differences in 
terms of yield per acre between share croppers and owners. Similar conclusions were 
drawn by Bliss and Stern (1082) Shahban (1987) compared the yield of share 
croppers on their own land vis-ii-vis leased in  land from eight ICRISAT study villages 
from Andhra I'radesh. Maharashtra and Gujarat. The main empirical finding of the 
study are that - (a) Outpi~t and i n p ~ ~ t  in ensities per acre are higher on the owned plots 
of a mixed share cropper conlpwred with the sliare cropped plots. (b) Differences in 
irrigation across tenure status is inlportant in explaining a large fraction of the input 
and outpi~t ditferences. soil quality variations are not (c) When the variation in 
irrigation, plot value arid soil quality is controlled for no systematic differences 
between the plots that are owned and those rented on fixed basis could be detected. 
The study therefore argires the sizeable differences found in the case of share croppers 
is caused by the form of contractual arrangements and not tenancy per sec. 
SOYBEAN YROD1IC:TIC)N AND PRODUCTIVITY IN INDIA 
The Post-Independence strategy of ayricultural development lay a greater 
emphasis on attaining self-sut'frciency in cereals and stlpport in terms of technological 
and institutional inputs were directed towards it In this process, pulses the major 
source of protein and edible oil remained neglected and the country relied on imports 
to bridge the shortfall in pirlses production The Yellow revolution associated with the 
quick spread of oil seeds since the 1980's took root in the less Irrigated areas of low 
and erratic railifall in the Semi-Arid Tropics of India. In  India in the mid-1980's. the 
country was importing 30% 01; its require~nent of edible oils bringing a strain on the 
balance of payment account A Technoloyy Mission on Oil Seeds was launched in 
May 1986 and this resulted in  a gradi~)~l but steady rise in  the domestic market prices 
of oil seeds as imports ol'oil seeds \ w e  restricted tl~rouyh non-tariff regulations. This 
trend was fi~rtlier accentu'lted in  Jani~ary 1989 when the National Dairy Development 
Board serviriy as the apex agency was set up During this period about 7 million 
hectares of additional area came under oil seeds, partly from rainy season fallow. 
partly through crop iritensification and a sirbstantial part through crop substitution. 
The shift was largely from coarse cereals, but in some pockets even pulses and wheat 
gave way to oil seeds (C;ulati and I<elly, 1990) 
India in the Oil seeds scenario accounts for 19% of the total area and 9% of 
the prodt~ctio~i, however the productivity is only 0.93 t ha" as compared to the world 
level of 1.63 t ha". Oil seeds forln the second largest commodity after cereals in 
India, accounting for I4 per cent of the country's Gross Cropped area and nearly 5% 
of the GNP and 10% of the value of all agricultt~ral products. Fourteen Million 
people are involved in the production ot'oil seeds arid 1 Million in processing (Hegde, 
2000). 
Given the deficit in pi~lses as well as edible oils, soybean assumes great 
significance as it contains aboi~t 45% protein and 18% oil. Though soybean (black) is 
traditionally grown on the foothills of the Himalayas, Kumaon and Garwahal regions 
of U.P. and some scattered pockets in central India, the awareness about soybean, the 
exploitation of its com~nercial potential and the introduction of yellow soybean is of 
recent origin starting with researcll at experirnental stations in the mid 1960's. The 
prospect of promoting black soybean. ciiltivated traditionally in  some parts of India 
were low due to its low yield, coloilr hard seed coat and lack of a market. Soybean 
seeds were introduced tYom the U S.A and tried between 1963 and 1965 at IARI, 
New Delhi. Pantnagar and Jabalpur Tlie University of Illinois. United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and Indian Council for Agricultural Research 
(ICAR) collaborated in this effort. Experiments suggested that a varietal break 
through of local conditions lniyllt be achieved and the all India Coordinated Research 
Project on Soybeans sponsored by ICAR was initiated in 1967 with its headquarters in 
Pantnagar. There are 19 centres involved in  the project in different agroclimatic 
regions. 
India's share in the world Soybean production in 1998-1999 was 5.2%. with 
production of 6 ~nillioti torlnes out of the total world production of 159.85 million 
Tonnes. 
The important Soybean proclucillg coirntries and their yields are as follows. 
Table 3 . 1 :  Soybean Production and Yield i n  the World 
Source: Oil Seeds : World Markets and Trade, Circular Series FOP 08-00, August, 
2000, Uriited States Department of Agriculture, 
0.94 t ha" is the average yield in India, with Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and 
Maharashtra Ilaving an  average yield of 1.06 Tonnes Per Hectare. The Yield 
reported is the averaye for tlle Trienniil~n ending 1993 (Source: ICRISAT, 1999, 
Typology Constri~ction and Economic Policy Analysis for sustainable Rainfed 
Agriculture). 
- 
Yield (t ha-' ) 
2.45 
2.36 
2.42 
1.75 
2.52 
3.12 
Coiintly I'~.oclt~ction ( 1090-2000) 1 (Million Tu~ltlrn) 
U.S.A 
Brazil 
Argentina 
China 
Paraguay 
European Union 
71.93 
3 1.40 
20.70 
14.29 
2.90 
1.14 
Soybean Production tioai I003 lias been as follows: 
Table 3.2:  Soybean I'l.oduction in India (Since 1993) 
Figure -3. l 
Soybean Production in India(Since 1993) 
Year 
1903- 1 994 
1994- I995 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-08 
1998-90 
I Production 
Production 
(in Million Tonnes) 
4.75 
3.93 
5.09 
5.4 
6.52 
6.90 
3.1 SOYBEAN PRODUCTIVITY IN IN1)IA 
The Productivity of soybeall in the 1070's and 1980's wee as follows: 
Table 3.3:  Productivity of Soybean in lndia (1970's and 1980's) 
Source: Bapna, 1992 citing FA(.) Yenr Book-various issues, 
ICRlSAT (1999) estimates productivity of Soybean for the below zones 
The data is the averages of tlie trienniutn endiny 1993. 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1983 
1987 
Zone 3 (Irrigated wheat zone of Central h'ladhya Pritdesh and U.P) : 1.02 t ha" 
Zone 8 (Rainfed Wheat-Chickpea zone of Celitral Madl~ya Pradesh : 0.81 t ha'' 
Zone 9 (Soybean dominant zotle of \Yes[erti Mndhya Pradesh : 1.06 t ha" 
Zone 10 (Rainy Season Sorylii~m-('otton-system of Western 
Maharashtra and parts of hladhya I'ratlesh : 0.96 t ha-' 
Prodilct ion 
('000 Tonnes) 
2 
120 
614 
850 
Area 
('000 He) 
4 
120 
836 
I392 
70% of India's Soybean is produced in Midllya Pradesli and the Gross Cropped Area 
in 7671.7 (1000 Hectares). The averaye yield fi~s Madhyn Pradesll varies from 0.81 to 
1.06 t ha.'. The Productivity i n  research ti11.11ls i 2.5 t lii~" (ICRISAT, 2000) compared 
to the averase of 1.06 t lia-I i n  Madliya I'r;ldesll atid 0 04 t ha*' in lndia as a whole. 
Yield 
(t ha" ) 
0.54 
0.75 
0.73 
0 61 
3.2 SOYBEAN UNDER A LIBERALISED TRADE REClME 
India signed the Uri~gi~ay Round Agreement (URA) of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) vested in the World Trade Organisation which makes it 
mandatory for member countries to gradually open their agriculture to world markets. 
The URA commitments in the area of agriculture fall under three main categories 
namely market access, domestic support and export competition. 
Market Access: Under mii~.ket access co~ilmit~nents, all member countries of the 
GATT are retluired to (a) replilce all type ot' nun-tariff barriers with tariff barriers and 
(b) reduce the level of tariffs unde~ a time bound pl.ogramme, theses levels are to be 
reduced by 24% in case of developiny countries. The period within which these 
restrictions are to be taken up varies from six years in the case of developed countries 
to ten years in the case of developing countries. 
The AMS is the annual aggregate value of 
market price support. non exempt direct payments and any other subsidy not 
exempted from the reduction commitments expressed in monetary terms. If the 
product specific and non-product specific exceeds 10% of the total value of 
agricultural production. it is to be reduced by 13 3% of the value that does not qualify 
for exemption during tlie implementation period India has basically two types of 
support for farmers First mal.ket price sul)po~-t, which is in the form of minimum 
support prices, announced by tlie C'om~nission for Agricultural Costs and Prices. 
Second is in the form of input subsidies on inputs like fertilisers, irrigation, credit and 
seeds. The calculations for India shows that AMS for 17 major commodities including 
Soybean is negative. This negative support (or net taxation) is due to the fact that 
prices of different crops are fixed by the government below international levels. 
E x ~ o r t  Competition: The GATT agreement calls for reducing export subsidies by 
24% from their 1986-88 level in case of developiny countries over a period of ten 
years. The quantity of subsidized export is to be reduced by 14%. 
Domestic Policv on Liberalisation: In  February 199.5 almost all edible oils (except 
coconut oil) have been put under the Open General license (OGL) with an import duty 
of 30%. In July 1996 it was reduced to 20% and in July 1998 the effective duty on 
edible oils works out to be 15%. Under the market access clause, members are 
required to convert no-tariff barriers and submit ceiling tariff bindings for all 
commodities. For Oil seeds in general the government committed to a maximum 
tariff rate of 100% although the prevailing rate in April 1996 was in the range of 40- 
50% in order to protect the oil seeds sector. 
Definition of the terms to be used 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) - is defined as the value of domestic resources 
needed to save a uni t  of Foreign Exchanye. 
Resource Cost Ratio (RCR) = DRC Shadow Exchange Rate 
For Soybean: 
The RCR scenario and the profitability rates under an import scenario 
according to ICRISAT (1909) are: 
Table 3.4: Resou~-ce Cost Riltio and Protitability of soybean Under a Liberalised 
Trade Regime. 
Source: Typology Constri~ction and Economic Policy Analysis, ICRISAT, 1999, PP. 
6 1-62. 
The RCR for Irrigated soybean is 1.07. which means the country has to spend 
Rs. 1.07 to save Rs. 1 .OO of Foreign Exchange whereas for rainfed Saybrrm, the 
country has to spend Rs. 0.98 to save Rs. 1 .OO of Foreign Exchange. The psbW profit 
Subsidies 
Rs. ha-' 
209 1 
903 
Irrigated 
Rainfed 
Average 
- 
RC:R 
1.07 
0.98 
0.99 
Private Profit 
Rs. ha-' 
4389 
6390 
6150 
Social Profit 
Rs. ha" 
- 1  129 
230 
-109 
is also higher with a positive social profit (due to lesser subsidies). The cost of 
subsidies of irrigated soybean is Ks. 2091 per hectare in comparison with only Rs. 
903 per hectare for rainfed soybean. If all subsidies were abolished, the profitability 
of Irrigated soybean will suffer by 48% and induce a shift away from the crop under 
Irrigated conditions. 
Therefore tlie policy implication is quite clear that research priority should be 
given to rainfed soybean and attetnpts should be made to bring an increase of rainy 
season fallow under soybean or tlie replaceable crops of cotton, sorghum or maize. 
To quote from an ICRlSAT study, 
"Since this zone (zone 9, including M.P.)  is dominated by a crop that is 
inefficient in resource use and low in generating social returns, it seems 
apparent that policies that correct for distortions in domestic prices would 
have their desil.ed ett'ect here i.e a shift away from soybean towards sorghum, 
maize and pigeolipea to achieve a better allocation of resources. This must be 
qualified if soybean possesses specific double-crop advantages relative to 
other rainy-season crops" (IC'KISAT, Ic)99, 68). 
"Given tlie present level of technology and relative prices of different crops, 
lndia lnay have achieved a high degree of 'Self Sufticiency' in edible oils in 
the early 1990's but at the cost of et'ficiency in the use of domestic resources. 
The challenges, therefore lies in retaining the gains of the yellow revolution 
while lowering tlie protection of oil seedsledible oils. With the opening of 
imports of most of tlie edible oils tinder the OGL policy . . . imports of edible 
oil crossed 1.5 rnillion tonnes in 1996-97 and are likely to touch 2 million 
tonnes in 1997-98. 
The Policy implications are clear: to sustain a high degree of self-sufficiency' in 
edible-oils, lndia will have to invest in raising yields of oilseeds as also improve 
edible - oil processing" (/hid, pp. 120- 127.). 
Research needs to concentrate on: 
(i) Trials, which would help tlie farmer to be convinced that rainfed 
soybean under tluctuating rainhll is possible and profitable. 
(ii) Increase the yield of rainfall soybean and reduce the gap between the 
potential and acti~al yield. 
This would help in making rainfed soybean more competitive in an open 
economy environment if the policy option is to attain self-sufficiency in the 
production of soybean. 
CHAPTER 4 
STLID\' AREA 
The State of Madhya Pradesli is the largest in the country, spread over an area 
of443,446 sq. km (13 5% of the total area of the country, data predates the formation 
of Chattisgarh state). The total popillation of MP was 66.14 million in 1991, 
accounting for 7.8 % of India's population. The state compromises of 14.6 % of 
scheduled castes and 22.3 % of sclleduled tribes. Ninety % of the rural population are 
engaged in agriculture, 5 2  % of the main working population in  the state are cultivator 
and 23.5 % were landless  labourer.^ (TARU, 1998). The Planning Commission 
estimated that in 1995, 42 5 % of tlte state's population lived below the poverty line 
with the national average at 3 3 . 5  D/o (GOMP, 1998). However it is estimated that in 
Vidisha district, the poverty head count ratio is below 10%. According to the Ninth 
Five Year Plan, per capita inconle in M.1'. was Rs. 6,597 as against the national 
average of R. 9,32 1 .  Altllough 90% of the rural population is engaged in agriculture, 
the con'tribution of the primary sector to tlte State Domestic Product (SP) is only 43 % 
with 25 % from secondary sector and 3 2  % from tertiary sector. 
4.1 VIDISHA DISTRICT 
Vidisha district is ranked 30"' in the Hitman Development Index (1998) out of 
45 districts in Madllya Pradesll with a HDI of 0,481 and ranked 37"' in the Gender 
Development Index witti GRI of 0 . 5 2 3 .  I .47% of Madhya Pradesh's population live in 
this district, with tlie Sclieduled caste and Sclledi~led Tribe population of 20.3% and 
4.4% respectively. The literacy %age for litales is 58% whereas for females it is 
27.8% (GOMP, 1998). The Gi tii Coet'ticient of operational holding is 0.555. 
The Land use pattern is as ti~llows: 
Net Sown Area 67% 
Forests 13% 
Other uncultivated lalid 11% 
Land not available for Cultivation : 6% 
Cultivable larid 2% 
Fallow 1% 
Irrigated area comprises of 7 1 ,  900 hectares with an unirrigated area of 44.48.800 
hectares. The average Fertiliser Consumption per hectare is 29.9 Kilograms. 
The Land ownership in  the district is as follows: 
Wholly Owned Area 0.9% 
Wholly Leased in Holdings 63.1 
Wholly Otherwise Operated Area : 3 1.2% 
Source: GOMP, 1998 citing Directorate of Agricultilre, Agricultural Statistics, 1990- 
9 1 and 1993-94, C:o~nniissioner of Land Records. 
The definition of 'wholly otherwise operated' is not mentioned and it is hypothesis that 
this refers to land ci~ltivated on government and common land illegally. It is also 
hypothesised that land operated by Iiouseholds above the land ceiling act are also have 
been taken into the 'Wholly Otherwise Operated' category. 
4.2 INTERVENTION OF ICRISAT A N D  BAlF  
The intervention of ICRISAT in  Lalatora village in the 1999 rainy season is 
part of a larger project titled "Improving Management of natural Resources for 
Sustainable Rainfed Agriculture" fi~~ided by the Asian Development Bank. The 
participating developing member countries of the project are India. Thailand. and 
Vietnam. 
The objectives of the project are to. (i) increase the productivity and 
sustainability of the ~nediicin and high water-holding capacity soils in the intermediate 
rainfall ecoregion; and (ii) develop environment-friendly resource mqgf rnen t  
practices that will conserve soil and water resources. The project fwiW# on the 
intermediate rainfall ecozone in central India, northeastern Thailand, and northern 
Vietnam where the an11~1al raiilfi~ll is about 800- 1300 mrn and where soils have a 
relatively high available water-llolding capacity. 
It is explained that the rationale for the interventions is due to the "Temporal 
variability in amount and distribution ot' raintill (which creates highly uncertain 
agricultural environment, which res~~lts  in food insecurity of poor farmers in Semi- 
Arid Tropics (SAT) and discoul.age tlle~n to make productive investment in 
agriculture" (ICRISAT, 2000, 1'. 2).  I t  is explained that the "cycle of unsustained 
agriculture and soil degsadation of derived communities in the Asian tropics can be 
stalled by the application of low-cost scientific rainfed agriculture" (ibid, p. 2). The 
project aims at intensification ot'crop production in the target environments through 
and the approach include the etlicient water use so that the incidence of waterlogging 
is reduced. 
The intermediate ~.ait~fi~ll zone in Asia receives rainfall between 800 to 1200 
mrn annually has black soils (Vertisols, associated soils and Alfisols). The main crops 
in the region are rainfed cash crops such as soybean, cotton and groundnut in addition 
to food crops s ~ ~ c h  as ~nul~ybean. laize. Piyeonpea and sorghum. In India, 72 million 
ha is covered by ve~tisol and associated soils The area under soybean has increased 3 
to 5% annually over the last 10- 15 yea1 due to the greater profitability of the crop and 
in 1999, 5.8 million hectares is l~nder the crop as compared to 10,000 hectares in 
1981. The productivity of soybean in  1.esetuc11 farms is 2.5 t ha" as against the current 
productivity level of 0.04 t ha" i n  India. I t  is estimated that the proposed technology 
(input practices including etfo~ts to reduce waterlogging) would spread at an annual 
rate of 5% in the soybean growing areas and tile ex-ante evaluation of the proposed 
investment in India and Vietnam is estimated to generate a Net Present Value 
equivalent to US $ 27  nill lion i l l  10 years time. It is argued that the 'increased 
production of soybean might brighten the prospects of export of soybean and bring 
down the import of edible oils and pulses' (ibid, p. 4). 
The intervention by ICRISAT in Lalatora village as a technically s;upported 
upfront demonstration watershed for the I909 rainy season crop has been under the 
above project and 18 t'armers were selected. The yield achieved by 12 sample trial 
farmers and their comparison with otlier owner-operated farmers in other villages is 
analysed in Chapter No. 5. 
Bharatiya Ayro Industries Foundation (BAIF) is the NGO working in the 
Lateri Watershed area, Lateri Block, Vidisha district. The average rainfall in the area 
in 1022 mm and clay, stony and loalliy soil is present in the area. The Rajiv Gandhi 
Watershed Mission of the Madliya Pradesh Government funds the watershed 
programme. The proyramlne comprises I I micro watershed areas covering 15 
villages. The implementation has been initiated in November 1997 with a total project 
cost of 4.23 Crore Rupees covering 7900 hectares The profile of the total proposed 
treated area is as ti,llo\vs 
Unirrigated 
Irrigated 
Waste Lalid 
Pasture Liind 
Forest 
The area treated for soil atid water conser-vation uritil 2 1.7.00 is as follows: 
Government Land 
Private Lalid 
Total 
2395.18 Hectares 
1297.86 Hectares 
3793.04 Hectares 
Plantation work has been unde~-taken in 0.33 hectare of government land and 
56.69 hectare of private land, while fuel wood plantation has been undertaken in 1.2 
hectares of government land and 46 96 I~ecriires of private land. 
A total of 46 Self-Help Gl.oups have been initiated with 380 members. In 
Jaoti, there is one Self-Help Group with three male members and another group of 
women also comprising three n~embers. In Kherkhedi, there are two male SHGs 
comprising I9 members and two women's group comprising 21 members. In 
Kundhankliedi no group has been formed. These groups are not functionins to the 
desired levels. The patriarchal society and the prevalence of the 'purhh' system 

OWNER OPERATED FARMS 
The optilnal management of the natural resources, soil and water with 
optimum input practices is necessary for sustaining and improving productivity of 
rainfed agriculture. The ilnponance of the ~no~isoons has an important variable has 
been recognised in the literat111.e (Roswenzweiny and Binswanger, 1993). The study 
year chosen is the 1990 rainy seilson wherein there was excessive rain, which lead to 
waterlogging due to poor drainage facilities. The impact of this on the decision 
making of the farmers and productivity is analysed. 
The importance of understandi~ig the relationship between land size and 
productivity (across various ow~iersliip yl-oups) remains important even today. A 
survey published by tlle I~lter~iatiolial Rice Research Institute estimates that in 1993, 
the arable land per capita as 0.20 ha which it is projected to reduce to 0.09 per capita 
by 2025. The input decisio~ls and the resultant output at various land sizes needs to be 
understood for an eff'ective strategy of growth i n  crop production and productivity, to 
achieve self sufticiency and compete in a liberalised trade regime. The yield gap 
between the current fil1.111 level pi.ixli~~tivity o f  soybean in India (0.94 t ha'') with 
those obtained in  resear.cli plots (1 5 t lia") ~iettds to be reduced and more production 
has to be achieved if India Iias to convert itself illto a self sut'ficient soybean producer 
from a net importer of Soybeans.The Lateri milli-watershed in  Videsha district 
comprises an area of 7900 hectares in I 1 micro watersheds covering 25 villages. The 
average rainfall i n  the area is 1022 millimeters. Clay, loamy and stony soil is the types 
of soil present in the area. The croppiny pattern in the rainy season of the area as 
reported by the implementing agency. B A l F  is as follows. 
Soybean : 54.8% 
Fodde r : 19.8% 
Sillall Millets : 20.8% 
Maize : 4.00/0 
Others : 0.0% 
The study of owner operated t:,lrms involved the collection of primary data from 39 
farmers in the villages of Jaoti (middle zone of the watershed), Kherkhedi (Lower) 
and Kundhankhedi (Middle Zone). Tlie data collected by the BAIF Agriculture 
Officer on the yield of 12 ICRlSAT trial t'armers from Lalatora villages (Lower Zone) 
is also used to compare the yield between the trial and non-trial farmers in other 
villages. 
The concept of productivity used in this study refers to yield per hectare. The 
methodology for cost of cultivation is as follows. 
5.1 METHODOLOGY 
a. Land pre~aration cust- 111 the case of tractors rented, the cost of hiring i s  
Rs. 200 per hour. 
b. Seed Cost- Rs. 12 per Kilogramme 
c. Diammonii~m PIiospliate(DAP)-Rs. I0 per kilogramme. 
d. Single Super Sulpllate (SSP)- Rs. 2.70 per Kilogramme 
e. Average Wage Rates prevalent i n  tlie village (per day) 
Sowins-Rs 40 
Weeding-Rs 40 to Ks 50 
Harvesting-Ks 50 (upto Ks 75 in peitk demand). 
Transportation-Rs 50 (Rs 30 per quintal of transportation to the market). 
f. The imputed labour costs of [lie landlord's, share cropper is not computed 
in  calculating the costs. 
g. Tlie cost of threshing rilliges from Rs. 3 to 5 Kg. for 100 Kg. of threshing. 
h. ICRISAT inputs provided to tlie trial tirmers are - Thiram, Bavistin, 
Potash and Urea. Tlie input quantity and ratio is as follows. Thiram and 
Bavistin seed treatliient helps in healthy crop stand. 
Thiram: Bavistin - 1.2 ratio 
Rhizobium-5 packets per hectare ( 1.25 Kg.). 
l 'ho.~l)h~/r . S ~ / I I ~ I / ~ . Y I I W  HLICICI*ICI(PSB)-S packets per hectare (1.25 Kg.) 
Murriate of Potash-SO Kg. 
Urea-50 Kg. 
5.2 JAOTI OWNER OPERATE11 FAllRlS 
Table 5.1 : Li~nd  Holding of Owner Operated Farmers-Jaoti 
18 K a n c h ~ g ~  
Total 
A v e ~  aye Hold~ng 
4 00 
68 06 
? 78 
0 00 
30 62 
1 70 
4 00 
98.68 
5 48 
0.37 
3 1.22 
1.73 
The total land holding ot'the I8 sa~iiple farmers is 96.68 hectares of which 
30.62 is lrriyable and tlie cultiva~ion duriny the I999 rainy season has been taken up 
in 3 1.22 hectares reflecting that O X  07% ot'the ci~ltivated land is Irrigable land. 
67.46% hectares remained uncultivi~tecl duriny tlie 1999 rainy season, which is 
69.77% of the land lioldiny uf the Ii~rnress 
Table 5.2: Mi~tletised li~pitts (clty) of Owner Operated Farms-Jaoti 
Correlation between Land Size and Felzilisei. Use = 0.22 
Table 5.3: Monetised Input Cost of Owner Operated Farm-Jaoti 
Average Cost of C:iiltivation Per I-lectare: Its 3 100 
Table 5.4 Per Hectar.e Costs-Jaoti Owner Operated Farms 
Correlation between land size illid cost ofcultivation per hectare = - 0.16 
Correlation between li~tld size and own days per hectare = - 0.46 
SI.No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Correlation between Li111d Size atid hired days per hectare = -0 .17  
Correlation between Li111d Size and UAI' cost per hectare = 0.22 
Land Size 
(ha) 
0.18 
1.25 
0.25 
0.25 
4.50 
0.50 
0.68 
0.50 
0.25 
2.00 
I .25 
6.00 
8.75 
0.50 
0.62 
1.87 
I .SO 
0.37 
The input intensity of labour is neyativeiy related with land size, fertiliser appSkation 
has a weak positive correlation. Two tilrmers did not do weeding operation$ a#Q input 
offailiscrs, 6 fanners did not do weeding operations and 5 farmers did not hws t  in 
Cost of 
C:i~ltivatio~i 
ha-' (Rs.)  
4772 
3014 
1152 
1816 
3 100 
3772 
31 12 
3560 
1380 
5700 
3 290 
3201 
2183 
5432 
7790 
3 200 
1272 
4549 
Ow11 Person 
days 
ha" (Rs.)  
61.11 
21.60 
140.00 
48.00 
33.33 
68.00 
17.65 
24.00 
28.00 
43.00 
46.40 
14.33 
7.09 
136.00 
122.58 
40.64 
18.00 
62.16 
Hired Man 
Days 
ha" (Rs.) 
38.89 
14.40 
0.00 
8.00 
22.22 
44.00 
0.00 
20.00 
0.00 
35.00 
12.80 
13.00 
5.26 
58,OO 
96.77 
32.09 
0.00 
0.00 
DAP cost 
ha" (Rs) 
1417 
680 
0 
0 
756 
0 
1250 
850 
0 
1700 
680 
850 
777 
0 
0 
682 
170 
1149 
fertilisers. The inverse relationship between land size and labour input and a weak 
positive correlation between land size and DAP reflects the risk-aversive behaviour of 
the farmers. This is due to i~icreased rainfall in the sowing season, which lead to water 
logging and increase the risk of a lesser output. 
Table 5.5: Labour Inputs - Own and Hired (Jaoti Owner Operated Farms) 
*PDs= Person Days 
Total Person days = 862 
Total Hired Days = 518 
Average Person days Per Hectare = 27.6 1 
Correlation between Land Size and Total Person days = -0.45 
Correlation between Land Site and Hired Person days= -0.17 
17 
18 
- 
16' 0 6 10 10 SO 
0 
4 
- 
76- 
Total 
5 
9 
i 6  
862 
0 
0 
60-p 
344 
4 1 
22 
10 
518 
0 
0 
-- 
27 
23 
27 
23 
0 
0 
18 
62 
Table 5.6: Output - Owner Cultivated Farms-Jaoti 
Correlation between Land Size and Yield Per. Hectare = -0.27 
Average Y ieid(t ha" ) = O 78 
Average Profit = Rs.2636 
Benefit - Cost R i i t i ~  = 1.86 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
0 5  
0.68 
0.5 
0.25 
2 
125 
6 
8 7 5  
0.5 
062  
I 8 7  
I S  
0.37 
Total 
6 
6 
5 
0 9 
20 
10 
55 
40 
12 
12 
25 
14 
I 
242.15 
1 20 
088 
1 00 
0 36 
1 00 
104 
0 92 
0 46 
2 40 
1 94 
134 
0 03 
0 27 
700 
700 
700 
650 
7U0 
700 
700 
835 
850 
750 
725 
775 
700 
4200 
4200 
3500 
585 
14000 
9100 
38500 
33400 
10200 
9000 
18125 
10850 
700 
1886 
2116 
1780 
345 
1 1520 
4113 
19205 
19102 
2716 
4830 
6000 
1908 
1683 
23 14 
2084 
1720 
240 
2480 
4987 
19295 
14298 
7484 
4170 
12125 
8942 
-983 
4628 
3065 
3440 
960 
1240 
4208 
3216 
1634 
14968 
2230 
6484 
5961 
-2657 
3772 
3112 
3560 
1380 
5760 
3072 
3201 
2183 
5432 
2583 
3209 
1272 
4549 
The land holdiliy of the sarnple fiarmers varies from 0.5 to 18.75 hectares and the land 
cultivated during the I990 rainy season frorn 0.25 to 8.25 hectares. The farmer who 
has put farm yard manure achieved a yield of 1.20 t ha" . The yield of farmers who did 
not do weeding operatiotls was lesser than the average yield at 0.60 and 0.36 t ha" the 
yield of the f~rmers who did riot do weeding operations was 0.88, 1.00, 1.04, 0.92, 
0.93 t ha-' and 0.27 t 113" with only farmer having a lesser than average yield. The 
yield of farmers who did not invest in fertilisers was 0.60, 1.20, 1.20,2.40 and 1.94 
t ha" with only farmer having a lesser yield than the average yield of 0.78 t hd' . 
Table 5.1: Land Size - Yield Relationsliip in  Jaoti owner operated Farms 
Correlation Betweell Laud Size and Yield = -0.27 

Table 5.8: Labour input of 5 Hiyhest I'roductivity Farmers 
The labour input of all (lit: above t'i11.1ners is fiir l i iyl~e~ than the average which is 21.89 
person days per hectare and tlie pl.ol>otion of Iliyher person days is also higher 
enabling them to escape the hlnrslliillian inet'ticiency. The very high labour input of 
219, 194 and 112 days are in snlaller land holdings of 0.62, 0.50 and 0.25 hectares 
respectively 
Table 5.9 : Labour Input  of 5 Luwest I'roductivity - Jaoti Owner Operated Farmers 
The labour input of all the above fi1r111e1.s except one is higher than the average person 
days per hectare(2 1.89) but the labour input of the highest productive farmers is an 
Land Size 
(ha) 
0.37 
0.25 
4.50 
8.75 
0.25 
average of 130.8 days. 'The iiuderinvest~nent of labour is due to the risk*averse 
behaviour of the farmers due to tlie waterlogging of the land during the wwing 
SI. 
No. 
18 
9 
5 
13 
3 
period. 
Yield 
027 
0.36 
0.40 
0.46 
0.60 
O\\ 11 
P c r s o ~ ~  
da\s p c ~  
~ a "  
6 :! 
2 Y 
34 
7 
140 
'YO of On n 
labour 111 
Total 
Labour 
1 00 
100 
60 
57 
100 
Total 
Pcrson 
rln\s pcr 
~ a "  
62 
28 
5 6 
12 
140 
H~rctl 
I~crson 
cl;~! s pcr 
I 
0 
0 
72 
5 
U 
U/;l of H~red 
Labour in 
Total 
Labour 
0 
0 
40 
4 3 
0 
FYM 
(Qtls) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.3 OWNER OPERATEL) FARMS-KllERKHE[)I 
Table 5.10: Land Eloldilly of Owlier Operated Farms-Kherkhedi 
The above table reveals tile exte~it of ~~ncl~ltivated land among the sample 
farmers. With a total land holding of  81 49 hectares(of which 33.99 hectares is 
Irrigable) otily 21.24 was taketi up fbr. cultivation in the 1999 rainy season, 60.25 
hectares was let\ uncultivated (73 03% of the land). The sawn area entirely consists 
of Irrigable land. 
Serial 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 . 1  
12 
Farmel. Name 
Lakhnn Sinyli 
Amol Siligh 
N.Sinyh 
Sardar Singli 
R.Giriraj Sharlna 
Ganesh Ralri 
Binay Singli 
Bandel Sins11 
Hitid Singli 
Kalyali Sing11 
Lekhraj 
Bhare Sinyh 
Total 
Dry Land 
(ha) 
0.5 
3.25 
3.25 
4.5 
0.75 
7.5 
6.75 
17.5 
0 
0 
0 
3 . 5  
47.5 
Irriyable 
Land (ha) 
14.5 
1.75 
I 
0.5 
0.87 
2.5 
0.25 
7.5 
3 
0.75 
1.12 
0.25 
33,99 
Total 
(ha) 
15 
5 
4.25 
5 
1.62 
10 
7 
2 5 
3 
0.75 
1.12 
3.75 
81.49 
Sown in 
Rainy (ha) 
4.25 
l,25 
2.5 
0.37 
0.5 
2.5 
0,25 
5 
3 
0.75 
0,62 
0.25 
2 1.24 
Table 5.1 1 :  Monetised Inputs (cluantity) of owner operated Farms 
Correlation betweell L ~ I I ~  Size atld I:e~.[ilisel. useage: O 08 
S1. 
No. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
Sowing 
Hired 
(Person 
Days) 
1 0  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Sowing 
Hired 
Tractor 
(Hrs) 
0 
0 
12 
1 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
DAI' 
(Icga) 
200 
X 0 
200 
2 5 
2 5 
100 
IS 
IS0 
3 0 
0 
0 
0 
Harvesting 
(Hired Person 
Days) 
40 
20 
50 
0 
0 
50 
0 
150 
30 
0 
0 
0 
Seeds 
Qty. 
(Kg.) 
400 
150 
350 
45 
50 
200 
40 
500 
350 
80 
60 
3 0 
FYM 
(Qtls ) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 4 
100 
Weeding 
(Hired Person 
Days) 
100 
12 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90 
20 
0 
0 
0 
Table 5.12: Monetised Inpu~ Clost ot'Owlier Operated Fartns-Kherkhedi 
Average Cost of Cultivation IJes I-lcctiue: Rs 4035 
Table 5.13 : Input cost and labour Input Per Hectare-Kherkl~edi Owner Operated 
Farms 
Correlation between la~icl size anit cost of cultivittiol~ per liectare = 0.50 
SI. 
No 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I 1  
12 
Correlation between land size and o\wl d;lys per hectare = -0.73 
Correlation between Land Size and hii.ed days per hectare = 0.93 
Land Size 
(ha) 
4 25 
1 25 
2 5 
0 37 
0 5 
2.5 
0 25 
5 
3 
0 75 
0 62 
0 25 
Correlation between Land Size iund LIAP cost per hectare = 0.09 
The positive co~-relati011 between land size and tlre cost of cultivation reveals that the 
farmer has i~ivested inl~uts more on scale, the hired labour shows also an higher 
positive correlation. I-iowever tlie i l l l l u t  of DAI' is weak at 0.09, therefore the higher 
cost incurred has bee11 on the Ili~ller propoltion of hired labour engaged as the land 
size increases. The total person days of 852 involves own iabo~~r  at 290 p e r m  days 
and hired labour engaged is 562 pcrsoti days. 
Cost c)f 
C'ult~vittion 
I-I;I.' 
4507 
4256 
5630 
-3 554 
2424 
3300 
-3 044 
4327 
3 127 
-3720 
1541 
3440 
Own Person 
days I-la" 
15 
10 
12 
7 8 
2 0 
8 
5 2 
0 
0 
7 7 
5 0 
56 
Hired Person 
days ~ a "  
3 3 
26 
20 
0 
0 
20 
0 
4 8 
17 
0 
0 
0 
DAP cost 
~ a "  (Rs.) 
800 
1088 
1360 
1149 
850 
680 
1020 
5 10 
850 
680 
0 
0 
Table 5.14, Labour 111puts - Own and Hired-Kherkhedi 
Average Person days I-1;;' = 40 
Correlation between land size and t o ta l  person days ~ a - '  = -0.32 
Correlation between land size end Ilired person days ~ a "  = 0.92 
1 1  
12 
5 
2 
Total 
0 
0 
852 
16 
8 
290 
0 
0 
562 
10 
4 
0 
0 
31 
14 
31 
14 
0 
0 
50 
56 
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Table 5.16: Land Size - Yield Relatio~lsllip in Kllel.khedi Owner operated farms 
Land Size 
4.25 
1.25 
2.5 
0.37 
0.5 
2.5 
0.25 
5.0 
3.0 
0.75 
0.62 
0.25 
Y ield(t ha") 
0.12 
2 
1.08 
1 
0.56 
1.2 
1.12 
1 
0.4 
0.67 
0.71 
0.5 
Fiyi~re 5.3 
Land Size - Yield Kelationsliio in KherktiediOwner operated farms 
-- 
- - -- -- - - - 
025 025 037  0 5  062 0 7 5  1 2 5  25 25 4.25 
Land Sown(ha) 
5 1 
;F Table 5.17: Labour a~id FY h l  Inpt~t of S Hiyllest Productivity Farmers- Kherkhedi 
The highest yield acllieved of 2.00 I 11;1" had an impo~zant input application, 6.40 
quintals of FYM without tile application of ally feniliser. The labour input of four of 
the five highest productive thrmei.s i n  khakhedi involved all the labour input being 
done by the owner a~id his t:imily anti tllei.rfcrre was able to escape the Marhsallian 
inefficiency. Tile average Inboui. inpi~t  ti.)^. three of the above farmers is higher than 
the average of 40 days per l1ecta1.e. \vllilr fi>r two tiirmers it as lesser than the average. 
However one sl~oirld ta1;en into accoullt the farnlers wit11 the higher input of 77, and 
56 days per Ilectare were snloller size :it 0.37, 0.25 hectares. A contrasting example is 
the farmer (sl.no.5) who has il yield 01.' 1.00 I h;r.' with labour input of 20 days per 
hectare 
52 
Table 5.18 : Labour Input o f 5  Lowest Productivity Farmers- Kherkhedi 
The labour itil~ut of tllree of the above t>rn~ers is higher than the average 40 
days per hectare and two brnlers hove only own laboi~r as total input of labour. Two 
farmers have a lesser intensity i1t 17 and 28  days per hectare. The reduction in the 
yield of the above farmers docs not owe cltre to differential labour inputs but due to 
the waterlogging of their fields i n  the sowilly period in Ji~ly 1999. 
SI. 
NO. 
7 
6 
8 
1 1  
9 
The land Iioldi~lg of the sanlple tirmers varies from 0.75 to 25 hectares, the 
land cultivated during the 1900 1.i1i11y season varies t iom 0.37 to 5 hectares. The two 
farmers who did  lot use f21.tilisc1.s. bc~t t~srtl FYM had contrasting yields of0.56 t ha" 
and 2.00 t ha " .  Tlielll~.ct' ii~rnlc~.s \vIlo did not cio weeding operiltions had yield lesser 
than the average yield - 0 . 4 0 ,  0.50 :,r l i l  0.07 t I I ~ I  ' I .  
Yicld 
(I 113-' ) 
0.12 
0.40 
0.50 
0.56 
0.67 
- 
Total PDs 
Ha-' 
52 
28 
4 8 
50 
17 
O \ \ I ~  ['Ds 
Ha" 
52 
8 
0 
5 0 
0 
Hircd PDs 
Hii-I 
0 
20 
4 8 
0 
17 
"/;,of 
0\\,11 
I:~bour 
io Total 
Labour 
100 
28.57 
0 
100 
0 
'K  of 
Hircd 
Labour 
in Total 
Labour 
0 
71.43 
1 00 
0 
100 
FYM 
(Qtls) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Land Size 
(ha) 
0.25 
2.5 
5.0 
0.62 
3 .O 
5.4 KUNDI-IANKIlEDI O\\iNElt O11El<:\'l'L.3D FARMS 
Table 5.19, Land Hold~ng of Owner Operated ~anners-Kundhankhedi 
The total land holding uf the 9 tiil.ll1el.s ~vhich cotistitittes the total population of the 
Owner operated fi1rmel.s in the vill,ise is 77 25 liectares of which 20.25 is lrrigable of  
which 20 liecti~res we1.e cultivit~ed during the I999 Rainy season with the rest 57 
hectares left uncitlt ivated 
v 
Serial 
No. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Total 
Farmer Nnmt: 
Viren Singh 
Girvar Sinyl1 
Gajraj S i t i~h  
Amreet Sing11 
Ram I'rasad 
Kalnal Sitlgh 
Amol Si~lyll 
Rast id 
1'. Si~igll 
Dry Land 
(ha) 
4 5 
1 75 
0 
0 
I) 5 
4 
31 25 
Y 75 
0 75 
5 7 
Irriyable 
Land (ha) 
3 
0.75 
I 
3 75 
1 25 
2 25 
6 25 
0 
2 
20 25 
Total 
(ha) 
7.5 
2.5 
1 
3.75 
1.75 
6.25 
37.5 
8.75 
8.25 
77.25 
Sown in 
rainy season 
(ha) ., 
3 
0.5 
I 
3.75 
1.25 
2.25 
3.75 
2.5 
2 
20 
.. 
Table 5.20, Murielisecl I~l l~r~~s(i j ty)  ~) 'Ow~ier Operated Farms 
Correlation between Lalid Size arid I-r~.tilise~. useaye: 0.30 
Table 5.2 1 : hlolietised Input Chst of Owner Operated Farms. 
St. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Average Cost of Cultiwtiun: Rs.3203 11;1" 
Seeds 
(Kg 
300 
5 0 
100 
300 
l I 0  
600 
300 
125 
200 
Sow~~ig  
tl~red 
I'erson 
Days 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Tmns. 
Cost 
(Rs 
900 
60 
135 
675 
105 
900 
480 
360 
360 
S1. 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I 
HlrccVO\\ II 
Trilc~o~ 
C o s ~  ( [ i s  ) 
1200 
0 
0 
1400 
0 
1) 
1) 
0 
0 
- 
Total 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
12095 
740 
3115 
65 19 
2415 
10150 
10720 
6780 
4970 
Sccds 
COSI 
(Rs ) 
3600 
600 
1200 
3600 
1320 
7200 
3600 
1500 
2400 
Su\v~~lg  
Iii~etl 
Tractor 
Hours 
6 
0 
0 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
DAI' 
Cos~ 
( I < <  ) 
2550 
O 
0 
O 
S50 
850 
7550 
DAI) 
(Kgs) 
150 
0 
0 
0 
50 
50 
150 
150 
100 
\Vcccl~l~g 
cosl 
(Rs ) 
1050 
U 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7100 
FYM 
(Qtls) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Han ~ S I I I I ~  
Cog 
(Rs ) 
1520 
0 
1600 
0 
0 
0 
1050 
1 
Weeding 
Hired 
Person 
Days 
3 5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 0 
33 
0 
Tl~rcshlng 
COSI 
(Ks 
1275 
8 0 
180 
844 
140 
1200 
640 
900 
0 
2550 
1700 
Harvesting 
Hired 
Person 
Days 
38 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 5 
3 0 
0 
480 
5 10 
000 
0 
55 
Table 5.22: IJer Hectare C'osis- Kllekllecli Owner operated farms 
Correlation between land size anrl cost uf cultivation per hectare = 0.24 
Si.No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Correlation between lariri size atid oh11 days per hectare = -0.03 
Correlation between Lnuct Size al~d I~ired days per Ilectare = 0.58 
Land Size 
(lla) 
3 
0.5 
I 
3.75 
1.25 
2.25 
3 75 
2 5 
2 
Correlation between Luntl Size alld DAIJ cost per hectare = 0.30 
The correletiou betweell lal~d size ~uid tlle cost of cultivation is not significant 
(0.24) therefore retlecting tililt ;IS the liilld size increases the farmer is risk-averse as 
does not incur higher ptupunionate illvestmc~lt costs, the input correlation of DAP is 
not significant at 0.30 Huwevel. tIie Ilired lilboul. sliuws a positive correlation (0.58) 
signifying that increased lilnd size rnli~ires tlir ~ i l i~ l i l l~ t~~n  alnoi~nt of labour especially 
during peak srssc)ns like bill.ves{ing illid t l i t~e~hin~ 2 d this cost has to be incurred. Out 
of a total person &ys of 710, L I I I I ~  180 po~*si)n di~ys wan ow11 labour with the rest 521 
days being hired labour 
Cost ot' 
Cultivatiun 
ha" (Rs ) 
4032 
1480 
31 15 
1738 
1932 
-451 1 
2850 
2711 
2-18 5 
O \ Y I ~  Man 
Days ha'' 
(Rs.) 
12 
12 
26 
6 
I9 
13 
30 
16 
4 
Hired 
Man ha.' 
(Rs. ) 
24 
0 
0 
I I 
0 
27 
3 1 
2 5 
0 
DAP cost 
~ a "  (Rs.) 
850 
0 
0 
0 
680 
378 
680 
1020 
850 
Table S 23 Labuur 111pnts - Ow11 and Hired ((Pcrson d;rys) 
Average Person days Ijcr I-fccta~u = .16 0 5  
Correlation between Lillld Size iuid -rural I'erson days IJer Hectare = 0.30 
Correlation between Li \~ ld  Size and I-lived I'erson days Per Hectare= 0.58 
SI. 
NO. 
1 
0 3 ~ 1 1  
Bullock 
(P%) 
0 
Hlrcd 
Btlllock 
(PDs) 
0 
2 1 2 0 
0 3 
\Vcctl~i~y - 
0 I 
(PUS) 
0 
2 
O 
2 0 
5 0 0 
0 
20 
5 
5 
5 
5 
\Vcctl 
I I~icrl 
(PL)sj 
3 5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
0 
0 
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -  
0 
G O  
80 
3 -7 
0 
I-~:II.\ c q  
0 I 
(P[)F) 
0 
Total 
0 
2 
8 
8 
4 
2 4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 3 
24 
30 
-30 
0 
0 
H:rn c s ~  
H I I ~ ~  
(fJDs) 
3 8 
Tot:ll 
P ~ ~ S O I I  
Di~ys 
(PDs) 
73 
0 
0 
4 0 17 
6 
46 
Person 
Days 
Per 
Hectare 
24 
Total 
0
Diiys 
(PDs) 
0 
0 
0 
3 5 
100 
100 
12 
46 
Toli\l 
Hired 
Days 
(PDs) 
73 
6 
46 
0 
0 
44 
95 
152 
146 
113 
739 
44 
35 
37 
13 
13 
189 
0 
60 
115 
133 
100 
521 
-
3 5  
43 
4 1 
59 
5 6 
Table 5.24: Outplit - O\vlrer- C'ultivated Farms-Kundhankhedi 
Correlation betwren Lalid Size aiid Yicld I'ev Hectare = 0 27 
Average Yield (I  ha" ) = O.OG 
Benefit - Cost Ratio = I S4 
Average Cost ofCultiva\io~\ = I(s 37-85 \-in'' 
Average Protit = I ts.  7,144 tl:~'~ 
Table 5.25: Land Size - Yield Kelatiot~sllip in l<undllankhedi Owner Operated Farms 
L : I I I ~  SIX (113) Yield {I ha-') 
I 
Figure 5.4 
~tionsll i!~ in Kundliankhedi 
0.25 0.25 0.37 0.5 062 0.75 1.25 2.5 2.5 4.25 5 
Land Sown(ha) 
Table 5.26: Laboilr I l l p u t  of'? I-lisllest ['~uciuctivity - Kundliankhedi Owner Operated 
Farn1er.s 
S1. 
NO. 
6 
1 
Yicld 
(( ha'' ) 
1.33 
1.00 
O\\ n
PDs 
t4;l.l 
I G 
I :! 
Tot:~l 
PD: H;I' 
43  
36 
1-1 I I CLI 
PI& 
 ti:^ ' 
27 
2 1 
' X I  ol'Ou n 
I,~bour I I I  Tot;11 
L;~bour 
33 5 
33 3 3  
I ~ r l d  
Size 
(lid 
2.25 
3 .OO 
- - 
'%I OF Hircd 
Lilbo~~r 111 
Tot;ll L;~boar 
67.5 
66.67 
- -  
FYM 
(Qtls) 
0 
0 
Table 5.27: Laboirs and FYh4 I n p t ~ t  ~ ) f  5 Loivest IJroductivity - Kundhankhedi Owner 
Ol~esatect Fas~~~ers  
The hiyltes input  intensity of Iitbour among Kundhankhedi farmers has not 
been a contributing t l ~ c t o ~  i l l  tllr Oift'e~.ent~aI pl-oductivity across the farmers. The 
highest prod~tctivity acllieved of' 1 3 3  T "'I" was with a labo~~r  input of 43 days per 
hectare of wl~ich o~lly 32.5% co~rlpl.o~~lisetI o\vn Inboi~s 
The total Ii111d l~oltli~lg 01' tile s;1111l~lr fhrmrss varied frorn I to 37.5 hectares 
and the land cultivated duri~ls tl~e 1099 1.i1i11y se;lson vi~ried from 0.5 to 3.75 hectares. 
The yield of the three tS~.mess wl~o dtd not i ~ l p i ~ t  festilisers was less than the average 
yield - 0.40 . 0.45 T I"'.' and U 60 T """ Tbr yield of the two farmers who did not do 
I 
weeding operations was I (lo I 11i1" i~ri t l  O 40 I hit . 
SI. 
NO 
5 
2 
7 
3 
8 
Yicld 
(t ham') 
0.28 
0.40 
0.43 
0.45 
0.48 
Toc;~l 
PDs t-i;~" 
19 
12 
6 1 
26 
59 
Lar~d 
Size 
(IN) 
1.25 
0.5 
3.75 
1 .OO 
2.5 
Ui\ 1 1  
PDr 
li:~.' 
I 0 
0 
3 0 
2 6 
16 
I l~lvtl 
fJ l) s
1-\,I" 
0 
0 
3 l 
0 
2 1 
' ,  I 
I;~bour 1 1 1  
To1;1l L;lbo~~r 
100 
100 
49 
100 
3 9 
'%, of H~rcd 
L;~bour in 
Tolibl Llbotlr 
0 
0 
51 
0 
61 
FYM 
(Qtls) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Table 5.28: ICRISAT T I ~ I I  Far11lel.s- Owner Operated 
Average Yield = I .  I I lia'' 
S1. No 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 I 
12 
13 
Correlation between Lalid Size ilnd I'roductivity per Ilectare = -0.39. 
5.5 SUMMAHISEI) KESIIL'I'S r\NL) ANALYSIS-OWNER OPERATED 
FARMS 
Name 
Kalnal Sinyll 
Lakshlnan 
Narayan 
Hnr i 
Zandel 
Dal 
Harnath 
Kripal 
I'ervez 
Bania 
T'ahelwali 
Vishan 
Hare Siligli 
Table 5 29 L J I I ~  t loldiil~ - Owner Operated Farms 
Land Size 
(ha) 
3.5 
2.5 
3 75 
2 5 
3 75 
2 5 
1 75 
1 5  
1 5  
1.5 
3 75 
1.5 
3 75 
Yield Per Hectare 
(I ha") 
1.60 
1.52 
0.67 
1.20 
1.47 
1.20 
1.37 
1.20 
1.60 
0.90 
0.5 1 
0.93 
0.80 
Sample 
Size 
18 
12 
9 
Sown in Rainy 
Season 1999 
3 1.22 
2 1.24 
20.00 
72.46 
Si. Village 
Na. 
1 Jaoti 
2 Kherkliedi 
3 Kundl~ai~khedi 
I . .  
Total 
11.signble 
( I ] ; \ )  
-30 62 
33.09 
2025 
83 86 
L)sy 
(ha)  
oS.06 
4 7 5  
57 0 
172 56 
Total 
(ha) 
08.68 
8149 
77 25 
257 42 
Table 5.30: Land Utilisation of Owner Operated Farms 
Table 5.3 1: Correlation between Land Size and Variables 
Village 
Jaoti 
Khcrkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
Table 5.32: Correlation between Land Size and Variables-Owner Operated Farms 
Sample 
Size 
18 
12 
9 
S1. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
Average Yield = 0.72 T "".' 
Awvage Cost of Cultivation = Rs.3320 
X q e  Profit = Rs. 2045 
A w e  Benefit Cost Ratio = 1.65 
Total 
Land 
(ha) 
96.68 
81.49 
77.25 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
Average 
Loss 
Amount 
(Rs.) 
3017 
3085 
0 
6102 
lrrigable 
Land 
30.62 
33.99 
20.25 
Total Person 
days 
-0.45 
-0.32 
0.30 
-0.37 
Fertiliser 
use 
0.22 
0.08 
0.30 
0.17 
Average 
Profit 
(Rs.) 
2636 
2444 
2166 
2045 
S1. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
Sown 
(ha) 
3 1.22 
21.24 
20.00 
Hired Man 
Days 
-0.17 
0.92 
0,58 
' Loss 
Making 
Farmers 
2 
3 
0 
5 
Yield 
(' 
0.78 
0.71 
0.66 
0.72 
Yield ' 
-0.27 
-0.38 
0.27 
-0.26 
B-C 
Rati 
o 
1.86 
1.3 1 
1.84 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
Average 
Total 
% of sown 
area 
Irripable 
98.07 
92.93 
98,76 
Cost of 
Cultivation 
(Rs.) 
3 100 
403 5 
3285 
% oftotd ' 
area 
uncultivated , 
67.46 
73.93 
73.78 
kWd Utilisation- The sown area in Jaoti, Kherkhedi and Kundhankhedi consists 
prdominantly of higable land. 98.07%. 92.23% and 98.76% respectively signifying 
that the soybean crop is predominantly grown on Irrigable land because of the 
vmiability of the monsoons is high. The %aye area uncultivated is predominantly dry 
land, which is 67.46%. 73.93% and 73.78% respectively. The dry land farmers in the 
study villages in the rainy season do not prefer to cultivate and instead prefer to lease- 
out to share croppers, as is the case in Jaoti village. This has important implications as 
the farmers prefer to grow soybean in Irrigable area. the intervention strategy to reach 
out to dry land farmers who leave the land uncultivated in the rainy season needs to be 
considered. The development of drought resistant varieties water management 
practices and the demonstration of optimum input practices would help in the increase 
in the area cultivated, the availability in the land-lease market would increase. 
However the need for equitable share croppiny contracts is important, the evidence is 
examined in the next chapter (Chapter 6) and the policy implications in the last 
chapter (Chapter 7). 
Productivitv- The average productivity among the 39 farmers is 0.72 t ha". 
The productivity in Jaoti, Kherkhedi and Kundhankhedi villages is 0.78, 0.71 and 
0.66 t hav' respectively in comparison to ICRISAT trial farmers who have an average 
productivity of 1.  I 1 I ha" . The productivity of farmers ranges from 0.12 t ha-' to 2.40 
tha" . 
The highest yield of by the farmer in  Jaoti in  0.5 hectares of Irrigable land, 
involved no input of fertilisers (compared to the average of 46 Kgs) with cost of 
cultivation of Rs.5432 per hectare (against the average of Rs.3 100. The labour input 
was 136 days per hectare of which 70% comprised of own labour which was highest 
~ o n g  all owner operated farmers. In comparison the lowest yield of 0.12 t ham' sown 
in 5,25 hectare of Irriyable land involved application of 15 Kg, of DAP with n 
W i n g  undertaken at cost of cultivation of Rs.3044. The labour input was 54 perso 
day& which was entirely of the farmer and his family. 
The yield of the farmers who utilised Farm yard manure is  as follows. 
Table 5.33: Yield of Farmers with FYM Input 
Land Si~e-Productivitv Relationship: The relationship is found to be inverse with the 
overall correlation being -0.27 with the correlation for Jaoti and Kherkhedi being - 
0.27 and -0.38 however in  Kundhankhedi villase the correlation was found positive 
at 0.27. Among ICRISAT trial farmers the relationship has been found inverse and the 
correlation is -0.36. 
S1. 
No. 
4 
11 
12 
Fertilisers. The relationship between Land Size and fertiliser useage is positively 
correlated but is not significant at 0.17. The correlation for the three villages Jaoti 
Kbrkhedi and Kundhankhedi is 0.22. 0.08 and 0.30. 
b b o u r :  The relationship between land size and labour days invested in cultivation an 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
hectare of land is found to inversely related with the correlation being -0.37. The 
correlation for Jaoti and Kherkhedi being -0.45, -0.32, however for Khundhankhedi 
the relation is found positive at 0.30, but not significant. 
Area 
(ha) 
0.25 
0.62 
0.25 
The productivity of the five highest productive farmers in Jaoti involved an 
s w a g e  labour input of 130.8 persotl days per Iiectare(own labour-63.45%), compared 
to 21.89 days among the five lowest productive farmers of which 90.93% 
ampromised of own labour. The productivity of the five highest productive farm 
in K h d h e d i  involved an average labour input of 85.57 man-days of which 90.26 
ccmdstad of own laboiir. The average labour input of the five lowest producti 
f m s  involved an average of 17.15 days per hectare of which 56.41 
own labour. The prodt~ctivity of the two highest productive farmers in 
involved input of 43 and 36 days per hectare comparcd to 19 and 
productive fwmers. 
F Y M  
(Qtls) 
9.60 
6.4 
10.0 
Yield 
(t ha") 
1.20 
0.56 
2.00 
The rationale for the farmers in  the sample villages is due to the performance 
of an imponant variable - Rainfall, and in this case in  the 1999 rainy season the 
probkm was of excess, particularly during the sowing period. The farmers report that 
it rained continuously for two days around June 20th. 1999. AJI important determining 
factor therefore was the slope and drainage of the land in escaping fmm waterlogging. 
The risk averse farmer therefore consciously under-invests his inputs to minimise his 
risk. Among the sample of 39 farmers, 5 farmers suffered losses amounting to Rs. 
5196 without adding the imputed market value of their own family labour. 
Rosensweig and Binswanger (1993) i n  their study attribute the risk-aversiveness in 
smaller farmers with fewer assets, which is due to the lesser ability for them in 
obtaining post-ante consumption smoothing mechanisms. 
Profit per Hectare: The average Profit per hectare is Rs.2045 with the profit in the 
above three villages being Rs 2636, Rs.2444 and Rs.2166 respective1y.A~ repofled 
above 5 farmers have suffered losses amounting to Rs. 6102 i n  total. 
The relationship between land size and productivity is found inverse with a 
negative correlation of -0.27 providing additional support for the existence of the 
inverse returns to scale relationship. ICRISAT trial farmers due to better input 
practices have been able to attain better yield of I .  1 t ha-' but have not been able to 
escape the inverse returns phenomenon which has became endemic in Indian 
agriculture. The role played by the monsoon rains has proved to be an important 
factor and in this particular year, excess of i t  has caused the variability among the 
yield of the farmers and the waterlogging potentiality of the land has been an 
important determinant. The farmers who have underinvested inputs had done so 
voluntarily to mini~nise the risks. This factor has a significant variable has been 
rscognised in an earlier study by Rosenszweig and Binswanger(1993) in a study of 
10 iCRlSAT sti~dy villages using data for ten years from 1975-76 and 
mbmmendations are otfered. 
The policy implications due to the above problem and intervention strat 
6k tho rtlkcholders, ICRISAT and BAlF are examined in the policy chapter 
Ne.q, 
CHAPTER 6 
SHARE CROPPER OPERATED FARMS 
A large propotion of of land holdings(79.4%) in Vidisha district are mponed 
to be leased-in with only, 1.7% classified as wholly owned and self operated with 
18% classified as 'otherwise operated', which refers to cultivation on government and 
the common land (GOMP. 1998). This reflects the presence of an inequitable land 
holding structure, which encourages the active operation of the lease market. The 
study examines the productivity of soybean grown by the share croppers and the 
profitability for the owner operated and share cropper farms are compared. 
The study involved the collection of data from 37 share croppers in three 
villages. There are three forms of share cropping in these villages. 
1. 20-80: Under this contract, the landlord undertakes the activities of sowing 
the seeds and the share cropper undertakes application of fertilisers and the rest of the 
activities. The output is shared in the 20:80 ratio between the Share cropper and 
landlord respectively. There are 8 share croppers under this contract in the sample. 
2. 33-66: All the activities are undertaken by the share cropper and the 
monctised costs are shared in the 33:66 ratio and so is the output between the Share 
cropper and landlord. The landlord does the seeds and fertilisers investment and the 
cost is shared. Twenty share croppers are under this contract in the sample 
. 
3. 50-50: All the activities are undertaken by the share cropper and t 
rnonatiscd costs are shared in the 50:SO ratio and so is the output between the S 
cmppcr and landlord. The landlord does the seeds and fertilisers investment and t 
cost is s h a d .  Nine among the sampled share croppers are under this contract. 
The supervision of the share croppers by the landlords is done intensive1 
ludw docs the investment of seeds pnd fertilisers initially. The labur inputs 
g t ~ r  of hi& labour to be engaged is decided mutually. The landlord pwiodic.&$; c 24 
visits the plots and instructions are issled to the tenant for accomplishment of 
activities within a given time. 
The duration of the lease period normally does not exceed two consecutive 
seasons. Although leasing is prohibited in  Madhya Pradesh, its enforcement is non- 
existent, but farmers due to risk-averse behavio~~r do not take risks and shift the 
tenants periodically. The emergence of the 20:80 contract wherein the landlord 
undertakes the sowing and fertiliser operation should be seen under this risk-aversive 
behaviour of the landlord to escape the 'tiller is tlie owner' legislation. This contract is 
usually between the small and marginal t'i~rmers who do not have capital and only 
they have their labour to otfer. 
The resource adjustment due to inequitable resource endowment, inequitable 
distribution of land holding and the banning of tenancy has helped in  the emergence 
of the 20:80 contract. The 33:66 contract is also a mechanism for resource adjustment 
between the better endowed landlord and the less endowed tenant. The 5050 contract 
is perceived by the land lords and even the share croppers as one which leads to a loss 
to the landlord has he has to share a greater propotion of the outupt. Under this 
contract, generally the tenant is obliged to loan without interest to the landlord . Only 
the principal is returned when tlie share cropper does not do any further leasing-in. 
Another reason is the non-availability of draft power with the landlord. 
The village-wise i~lforlnation is as follows. The source for the tables are 
primary data. 
6.1 JAOTI SHARE CROPPERS 
Table 6.1: Land Leased by Jaoti Share Croppers 
Source: Primary data (for all the tables). 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
v 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Share Cropper's Name 
S.Ram 
G. Bishkaruna 
Kallu 
Jagdish 
Chintulal 
Lala Ram 
GajrajSinyh 
Babu Lal 
Ram Lal 
Kancheri 
Prakash 
D. Singh 
Bharat Sinyh 
Ganga Ram 
Kallu 
Shivnarayan 
Bansi Lal 
- 
Hariram 
Ram Sing11 
Nathu 
Total 
Dry Land 
(ha) 
1 25 
1.25 
3 75 
2 5 
0 5 
1 25 
0 75 
3 00 
0 50 
0 25 
2 00 
1 25 
0 00 
2 00 
0 00 
0 00 
1 25 
2 SO 
Irrigable Land 
(ha) 
0 00 
0 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.75 
0 00 
1 50 
1 25 
0 00 
0 00 
Sown in 
Rainy 
season 
(ha) 
1.25 
1.25 
3.75 
2.5 
0.5 
- 
1.25 
0 75 
3 -00 
0.50 
0.25 
2.00 
1.25 
0.75 
2.00 
1.50 
1.25 
1.25 
2.50 
1 25 
1 75 
30 25 
0 00 
0 00 
3 5 
1.25 
1.75 
30.5 
3 
The Sample Share Croppers in Jaoti leased in 33.75 hectares of which 30.5 
hectares were sown. 18 of the 20 farmers leased in dry land. this land is cultivated 
only in the rainy season and for the rest of the year is left uncultivated. 
Table 6.2 : Own Land Holdiny of Jnoti Share Croppers 
* Leased out own land for two years for Rs.40,000. 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 I 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Share Cropper's Name 
%Ram 
G Bishkarma 
Kallu 
Jaydish 
Chintulal 
Lala Ram 
Gajraj Singh 
Babu Lal 
Rain Lal* 
Kancheri 
Prakash 
D Singh 
Bharat Singh 
Ganya Ram 
Kallu 
Shivnarayan 
Bansi Lal 
Hariram 
Ram Singh 
Nathu 
Total 
Own Land Dry 
(1x1) 
1 75 
0 
0 
0 
0 37 
0 
0 75 
0 
4 00 
0 
0 
0 
1 75 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.62 
0 
0 
I0 24 
Own Land lrrigable 
(ha) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 .oo 
t 
Table 6.3: Credit and Labour Transactions with the Landlord 
* 50:50 share cropping cuntract. 
Ten share croppers took cash loans at 36% interest from the landlord and tive 
farmers among them also borrowed wheat. The loans are incurred during the sowing 
period in the third week of July and returned ~ R e r  the sale of the output, which is 
completed by the third week of October. 
Table 6.4: Monetised lr~put Quantity of Share Cropper Operated Farms 
Cornlation between Li111d Size iind Fe~tiliser(DAP) useaye = -0.45 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
I5 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Average DAP Input Per Hectare = 36.55 Kg. 
Seeds 
(Kg-) 
100 
100 
So\rlll~ 
Hlrcd Tractor 
Hours 
3 
6 
20 
DAP 
(Kgs) 
5 0 
0 
A 
0 
300 
250 
50 
150 
65 
300 
80 
20 
165 
110 
100 
150 
150 
150 
150 
225 
125 
2 150 
0 
0 
0 
13 
10 
0 
0 
0 
18 
30 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
\ 6 
0 
50 
Wccdl~ly 
Hirrd PDs 
3 3 
0 
0 
15 
5 
0 
0 
4 5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
J 
3 
0 
20 
9 
0 
14 
40 
20 
0 
34 
5 
0 
2 8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
---- 
150 
100 
2 5 
7 5 
3 0 
5 0 
40 
20 
75 
5 0 
100 
75 
75 
50 
50 
0 
50 
Harvesting 
Hlrd PDn 
18 
0 
86 49 
80 
1 00 
1 00 
120 
8 7 
1 00 
160 
80 
83 
8 8 
133 
7 5 
100 
120 
120 
90 
100 
2 1 
40 
200 
96 
116 
33 
320 
320 
4 1 
70 
178 
38 
67 
96 
96 
36 
80 
Seed 
Kp. 
Hi' 
80 
80 
DAP ' 
KB. 
Ha'' 
64 
6 1 
71 
Table 6.5 : Monetised Input Cost of Sliare Cropper Operated Farms (Jaoti) 
Average Cost of Cultivation Rs.28 13 
Average Cost of Cultivation for Landlord: Rs. 1726 
Average Cost of Cultivation for Sllare Cropper: 1087 
SI. 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
t 
Seeds 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
1200 
1200 
3600 
3000 
600 
1800 
780 
3600 
960 
240 
1980 
1320 
1200 
1800 
I800 
1800 
1800 
2700 
1500 
1800 
Hired 
Tractor 
Cost (Rs) 
450 
1200 
3000 
3000 
0 
_ _ _  
0 
900 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600 
600 
400 
DAP 
Cost 
(Rs) 
850 
0 
2550 
1700 
425 
Weeding 
cost 
(Rs ) 
1000 
1000 
0 
0 
0 
Harvest 
Cost 
(Rs ) 
720 
5 00 
0 
800 
450 
1275 
510 
850 
680 
340 
1275 
850 
1700 
1275 
1275 
850 
850 
0 
850 
850 
384 
135 
135 
143 
0 
504 
225 
42 
353 
120 
192 
113 
126 
42 
5 4 
Thres. 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
725 
147 
528 
216 
168 
390 
3 00 
0 
0 
0 
540 
900 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
480 
0 
0 
480 
180 
180 
150 
23 
630 
300 
60 
360 
150 
240 
150 
210 
60 
90 
1000 
560 
1600 
400 
0 
1020 
200 
0 
0 
0 
800 
0 
100 
0 
0 
5329 
3365 
6365 
2333 
603 
5949 
3795 
3002 
3788 
3345 
3882 
2913 
4216 
3052 
3194 
Transport 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
300 
210 
660 
270 
210 
---- 
Total 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
5245 
4257 
10338 
8986 
1853 
Table 6.6: Labour Input - Own and Hired for Jaoti Share Croppers 
SI. Ow11 H~rcd Wccd Wcod Hnwcs~ H;I~,CSI Totill L.L. S.C PDs No. Bdiock Bullock O\\n Hircd O\ \e  Hlrcd PDs PDs PDs ~ e r ~ a "  
(PDs) (PDs) (PDs) (PDs) (PDs) (PDs) 
1 0 0 33 0 47 0 14 69 5 5 
2 0 0 33 0 10 43 0 33 26 
3 0 0 0 42 0 42 42 11 0 
4 0 0 0 0 20 0 2 0 20 8 
5 5 12 0 2 9 28 0 28 56 
6 6 2 13 2 0 33  0 33 26 
7 0 10 10 * ) 14 37 0 3 7 49 
8 8 0 0 2 40 50 50 17 0 
Total Person days = 787 
Share Cropper Person days = 787 
Land Lord Person days = 0 
Average PDs per Hectare = 25.80 
Average S.C. Person dilys Per Hectare = 25.80 
Average L.L Person days Pel- Hectare = 0.00 
Table 6.7: Land Size- Yield Relatiorlship aillarlp Jaoti Share Cropped Farms 
(in ascending order of lalid size) 
Land Size I Yield 
(ha) 
Correlatiurl between Land Size a11d Yield = -0.30 
( t  ha") 
2 
2.5 
2.5 
- 
3 
3.75 
Avy. Yield 
1 
0.60 
0.36 
0.28 
0.20 
0.59 
0.54 
Figure 6.1 
Land Size- Yield Relationsliip among Jaoti Share Cropped Farms 
0.25 0.5 0.5 0.75 0 75 1 25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1 25 1 5  1.75 2 2 2.5 2.5 3 3.75 
Land Holding Size(ha) 
Table 6.8: Land Lord Illput - Output in Jaoti 
The average protit per Ilectt~se leased out is Rs 833. The Benefit cost ratio is 
1.48. Five Landlords i~icussed a total loss of Rs.5167 ranyiny from Rs.893 to Rs. 
1243, four of them had contracted ed~iides the 33:66 ratio and one under the 5050 ratio. 
SI. 
I 
2 
SC LL 
Output Sllarinp 
Ratio 
33 66 
50 50 
Cost 
(RE ) 
3495 
2128 5 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 I 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Pelson 
days 
0 
0 
50 50 
50 50 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
50 50 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
33 66 
1100 
4 SO 
466 
I066 
400 
400 
3 33 
0 SO 
1399 
666 
133 
6 00 
333 
5 33 
3 33 
466 
I 33 
2 00 
5 169 
4493 
1235 
355 I 
2242 
4242 
1555 
402 
3 964 
2529 
200 1 
I894 
7,229 
2587 
194 1 
7,s I0 
2034 
7,125 
Output 
(Qtls) 
666 
3 50 
8800 
3600 
3732 
8530 
2999 
2999 
2332 
475 
Ill96 
4998 
933 
5880 
2666 
3998 
1999 
3265 
800 
1399 
Gross 
Output 
(Rs.1 
4998 
2450 
3631 
-893 
2497 
4979 
756 
-1243 
777 
73 
7232 
2469 
-1068 
3986 
436 
1411 
58 
456 
-1234 
-729 
968 
-357 
4994 
3983 
1008 
-414 
1555 
292 
36 16 
1975 
- 1423 
1993 
29 1 
1129 
46 
182 
-987 
-4 17 
Net 
Profit 
(Rs ) 
1503 
3 22 
Profit 
Per Hectare 
(Rs. ) 
1202 
257 
Table 6.9 : Share Cropper - Outpllt Share -Jaoti 
*SC refers to share croppers and LL refers to Land101.d 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
SC:LL 
Out~tlt 
Sluuillg 
R-ilio 
33:66 
5050 
50:50 
5050 
3356  
33:66 
19 
20 
Cosl 
(Rs.) 
1750 
2128 
5169 
4493 
618 
1778 
33:66 
33:66 
Pcrsol~ 
dnys 
O\vn 
18 
0 
42 
0 
14 
14 
1018 
1066 
Pcrso~~ 
d;lys 
Hircd 
51 
33 
0 
20 
9 
13 
57 
48 
3x9 
0up111 
(Q~~ii l~i~ls)  
3.34 
3.50 
11.00 
4.50 
2.34 
5.34 
0 
0 
341 
Ciross 
Olttput 
( Q W  
2502 
2450 
8800 
3600 
1868 
4270 
0.67 
1.00 
Nct 
Proiil 
( b . 1  
752 
322 
3631 
-893 
1250 
2492 
400 
701 
Profit 
~ a . '  
(Rs.1 
602 
257 
868 
-357 
2500 
1994 
Total S.C. ' 
Person 
&7ys 
(Rs.) 
69 
33 
42 
20 
23 
27 
57 
48 
-618 
-365 
-494 
-209 
The averaSe protit per hectare leilscti-ill is Rs I 3 3  The Benefit cost ratio is 
1.48. Five Share Crol111r1.s inciirred losses l . i l~ l s i~~s  ti.0111 Rs.365 to Rs. 1 145 totalling 
to a loss 0 f R s  3032. four of tlie share croppr1.s hnd colitracted under the 33:66 ratio 
and one under the 50:50 coritract 
Table 6.10: Iriput Intensity of Low Productivity Farmers-Jaoti 
(less than averaye yield) 
*Serial No. Refers to the serial numbers of t\~rmers as used in the previous tables. 
Average Person days for Jaoti Share Croppers = 26.19. 
Average Fertiliser useege per Ilectare = 36.55 Kg.. 
Sl.' 
No. 
19 
20 
8 
4 
17 
The input inte~lsity of DAI' is hiyller tllsii tlie averaye for four of the above 
fumers. however tile Lbour contribution is lesser than the averaye for three farmers. 
However the more iinponant 1:ictor that has H be~riny on the productivity (specifically 
during the 1999 rainy srsson) is the slope i~nd drainage facility of the land. which 
deermines the nl l l  otx a11d potential of the lalld to escape fi0m water!og~ing. 
Yield 
(t ha-') 
0.16 
0.17 
0.20 
0.36 
0.40 
Sccds 
ha.' 
( K g )  
100 
86 
90 
100 
170 
DAP 
ha ' 
( K y s )  
SO 
40 
03 
40 
OO 
Wccdllly 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
N O  
P D ~  
ll:il 
4 9 
2 7 
17 
8 
I9 
Crop 
Sbring 
Ratio 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
50:50 
33:66 
Protit 
hi' 
L;lndlord 
(Rs ) 
-987 
-4 17 
-414 
-357 
46 
Profit ha'' 
Sinre cropper 
(Rs.) 
-57 
-48 
-42 
-357 
-20 
Table 6 I I Input ltite~lsity of 5 High Productivity Farmers-Jaoti 
(nlore than average yield) 
Average Person days fur Jaoti Shase Csoppess = 26. I9 I'Ds 
Average Fertiliser use per hectare = 36.55 Ky ha" 
SI.' 
No. 
11 
1 
7 
12 
16 
The input intensity of DAP is Iliyller tllnrl the average for all the above 
farmers, in the case of labour except one fitrmer, the intensity is above the average 
Table 6.12 Loss making Share Croppers in  Compal.ison to the Landlords - Jaoti 
Yield 
(t ha") 
1.05 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
0.64 
*serial number refers to the sllarr croppers u~ ld  It~ndords as used in the previous 
tables. 
Sccds 
ha" 
( K p )  
83 
80 
87 
88 
120 
Shore 
Contract 
5050 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
DAP 
1la.l 
(Kys) 
41 
64 
116 
70 
96 
Lar~dlord 
Man 
Days 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Sharc 
Cropper 
Pcrso~i 
days 
20 
42 
18 
57 
48 
wccdwg 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
GI 05s Output 
Sll;lrc 
C'roppcr 
4 SO 
2 00 
0 67 
0.67 
1.00 
C; I oss 
Output 
L:~~~rllord 
(l'onncs) 
4 SO 
4 00 
1 33 
133 
2.00 
Laadlord 
I1rofit/ 
Losh 
(Rs ) 
-893 
-1243 
-1068 
-1234 
-729 
Sr. 
No.* 
4 
8 
13 
19 
20 
~ D S  
I1a.l 
29 
5 5 
4 9 
45 
I9 
S11arc 
Cropper 
Loss 
(Rs ) 
-893 
-622 
-534 
-618 
-365 
profit h i 1  
Slim cropper 
1810 
602 
505 
989 
565 
Profit 
ha. I 
Landlord 
(Rs ) 
36 16 
1202 
I008 
1975 
1129 
Crop ' 
Sl~ring 
Ratio 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
33:66 
The productivity of sir fklsnls wllicli did not do weeding operations are 0.59. 
0.36. 0.20, 0.33. 0.64, O 40 t h : ~ '  wit11 b ~ ~ r  of '~ l l e  t l r~ners  having a yield less than the 
average yield of 0.54 t 111.' . All tllc sllare cropper operated Rrlns are in unirrigated 
land except three farms wllicl~ account tbri 5 hectares, This is a significant factor in 
the lower productivity attained among the Jnoti share Croppers, 0.54 T ~ '  in 
comparison to Owner operated farlils wllere iiiujority of the land is lrrigable the Yield 
is 0.78 t ha" . 
Table 6.13 : Lalid Leased(1ia) by Share Croppers 
Among the 13 mmple t l r ~ ~ l r r s  16.24 hectares were leased-in of which 15.81 
huctarcs was cultivated. 
Sf. 
No. 
1. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
Share Crclpper's Nariie 
Mahesh 
Lekliraj 
Rajaram 
Partnal 
Pahelwan 
Pyarelnl 
K.Lal 
N Sinyh 
-- ~~ 
Ashok 
C. Lal 
B. La1 
D. Singh 
M. sinyh 
Total 
Averaye 
Dry L;~nd 
(ha) 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 87 
0 
0 
0 
1 25 
0 
0 
0 
5 2 5  
0 40 
Irrigable 
Land (ha) 
0 
I 
0 5 
0 12 
0 
0 87 
2 5 
1 25 
0 
I 
I 
1 25 
1 25 
I099  
0.84 
Total (ha) 
2 
I 
0 5 
0.12 
0.87 
0.87 
2 5 
1.25 
1.25 
1 
I 
1.25 
1624 
1 24 
Sown in * 
Rainy 
season (ha) 
2 
1 
0.5 
0.12 
0.87 
0.87 
2.5 
1.25 
1.25 
1 
1 
2 
1.25 
15.81 
1.21 
Table 6.14: Kherkhedi Share Croppers - Own Land 
*In Serial No.6 and 7 the Isrigable land is ~ove~.nment  land beiny illegaly cultivated. 
Serial 
NO. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
Share Cropper's Name 
Mahesh 
Lekhraj 
Rajaram 
Parmal 
Pahelwa~l 
Pyarelal 
K.LaI 
N.Sinyh 
Ashok 
C. Lal 
B. Lal 
D. Singh 
M. sing11 
Total 
Own Dry Land 
( h i t )  
0 
0 
I 
1.75 
0 
I 
1 . S  
0 
0 
0 
2 .75  
0.50 
0 
7 . 5  
Own lrrigable Land 
(ha) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
8 1 
Table 6.15: Credit and Labour Twnsactions with the Landlard-Kherkhedi 
Four among the I 3 share cl.oI1pel.s i~~curred cash arid wheat loans while 3 share 
croppers worked as laboul.ers i ~ \  tlir owner o11el.ated farnis. 
r e  
Cropper's 
N a m e  
Mahesh 
Lekhraj 
Rajaram 
Parmal 
Pahelwan 
Pyarela1 
K.Lal 
N.Singh 
Ashok 
C. Lal 
B. La1 
D. Singh 
M. singh 
Amouilt 
Borro\\ cd 
(Rs ) 
3000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1000 
0 
0 
6000 
0 
1000 
0 
o 
l i l t  crust 
K:ltc 
(XJ) 
3 6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
36 
0 
0 
3 6 
0 
0 
o 
0 
\Yllc.~t 
Borro\\ cd 
(Kg ) 
3 00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 0 
o 
0 
3 00 
0 
100 
0 
o 
Wl~c;lt 
Rcttr rrlcd 
(Kg 
350 
0 
0 
0 
0 
62 5 
o 
0 
375 
0 
125 
0 
0 
Amonnt 
Loaicd-to 
Landlord 
Wltllout lilterest 
(Rs 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
Works in the 
Landlord's 
Own h d  
Yes 
No  
N o  
No  
No  
Yes 
No  
No  
No 
N o  
Yes 
No  
No  
82 
Table 6 16 : Monrtised Inpiits(cjuailrity) of owner operated Farms-Kherkhedi 
Correlation Between Lalid Size and Fel-tilise~.(DAI') itseaye: - 0.03 
Average Fertiliser Input pel. Hectare = 63.25 Kg. Iin. I 
Table 6.17: Monetised(Total) l ~ l p u t  Cost of Sllarr Cropper operated Farms - 
Kherkhedi. 
Per Hectare Costs 
r 
Average Cost of Cultivation Rs.4552.24 11:i ' 
Average Cost of Ctlltiviitiaa fix Liindlold: Ks278 149 11r.l 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Avenge Cost of Cultiviltiuli for  SI\;II e C~~ol ) l~r i .  R s  1770.75 1~1. 
Cost 
(Rs.1 
2400 
1200 
600 
120 
2100 
3000 
3000 
Hlrcd 
Tractor 
Cost (Rs ) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1800 
1000 
0 
DAp 
cost 
r ) 
1700 
1700 
850 
0 
0 
7,550 
7,550 
1200 1200 2000 300 225 
--- 
300 
120 
525 
300 
300 
-- 
1200 
1200 
1200 
2400 
1800 
W C C ~ I I I ~  
c o s t  
(RS ) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600 
0 
0 
5775 
6575 
5680 
6355 
5855 
4850 
1200 
0 
1000 
0 
300 
H;\rv~st 
C'ost 
(Rs) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
350 
0 
2000 
1275 
1700 
850 
1700 
850 
TIircs 
Cost 
(Rs) 
1470 
943 
225 
7 5 
210 
825 
1800 
I800 
900 
480 
480 
1200 
Trm~p0i-t 
Cost 
(Rs.) 
300 
195 
180 
60 
157 
660 
1350 
Tori 
Cost 
(Rm.) 
5870 
4038 
1885 
255 
5217 
8035 
10700 
400 
1600 
1600 
600 
0 
400 
160 
700 
375 
400 
Table 6.18: Labour lnpi~ts - Own iind tlired for Kherkhedi Share Croppers 
(Person days) 
Average Person Days = 57 52 II;I" 
Average L.L Person Days = 1 i Y  I I : ~ . '  
Average S.C Person Days = 5 5  34 lla" 
SI. 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
Total 
Owl1 
Bl t l l ~~k  
(PDs) 
16 
8 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
8 
0 
16 
0 
b 
A 
Hired 
B~~llock 
(PDs) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
W C C ~ I I I C :  
I 
(PDs) 
60 
30 
10 
4 
30 
0 
0 
40 
60 
30 
16 
60 
4 0 
W C C ~  
Hlrcd 
(PDs) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
30 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16 
0 
H , I ~ C S I  
I 
(PDs) 
32 
20 
o 
7- 
1 G 
7.5 
10 
12 
13- 
0 
3 2 
16 
3 6 
H,~ncsl 
Hlrctl 
(PDs) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 
40 
40 
8 
32 
0 
12 
0 
PDs 
per 
Heclrrc - 
54 
58 
40 
- 
67 
84 
86 
20 
82 
64 
70 
48 
54 
61 
Tol;rl 
PDs 
108 
58 
20 
8 
73 
75 
50 
102 
80 
70 
48 
108 
76 
8 76 
L L. 
PDs 
16 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16 
0 
34 
S.C 
PDs 
92 
58 
20 
6 
73 
75 
SO 
102 
80 
70 
48 
92 
76 
842 
85 
Table 6.19: Land Lord Input  - Output - Kherkhedi 
Correlation between La~ici Size anci L i~~~~l lo~- t l  I'e~.son Days . -0. 13 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Land Lord B:C Ratio : 2 01 
Average Gross Output for a Httc~alt leased-out - 0.75 Tonlles 
(out of averaye output of 0.99 T o ~ ~ l ~ e s  l ~ i ' )  
SC:LL 
Outpllt Shaliag 
Ratio 
20:80 
33:66 
33:66 
20:80 
20:80 
33:66 
20 : 80 
33:66 
20:80 
5O:SO 
20:80 
20:80 
20:80 
Average Profit Per Hectare Leased-out - Rs. 2930 
2 Leased-ollt farfilers sutli.red lasses of i<s b2 I and RE 1240 who had a 20:80 and a 
50:50 contract respectively 
Cost 
(Ks.) 
4 100 
2692 
1237 
120 
3 900 
5356 
5550 
3850 
3675 
2840 
5084 
4100 
2950 
IJcrson 
I 
16 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
i 6 
0 
Ouput 
(()tis) 
8 
4.29 
3.96 
I .  
4.2 
14.52 
36 
4.95 
8 
2 
14 
8 
8 
Gross 
profit 
(Rs.1 
5880 
31 I0 
2970 
1200 
3360 
I0890 
28800 
3960 
6400 
1600 
11200 
6000 
6400 
Nct Profit 
(Rs.) 
1780 
419 
1733 
1080 
-540 
5534 
23250 
110 
2725 
- 1240 
(5116 
1900 
3450 
Profit 
PerHectare 
(Rs .) 
890 
419 
3467 
9000 
-62 1 
636 1 
93 00 
' 88 
2180 
- 1 240 
61 16 
950 
2760 
Table 6.20: S11a1.e C:~.opper - Outl)t~t Sliare - Kliel-klledi 
Correlation between Land Size n~ld Sliare C'ropper' l'erson days = 0.44 
S1. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
The share cropper Betletit cost ratio was 1 15 (in co~nparison to 2.01 for 
landlords) wit11 the average profit per hectiue leased in  being Rs.258(in comparison 
to Rs.2930 for landlords) Tlle average gross o i~p i~ t  for an hectare leased out is 0.24 
t b' (out of an average output of O 0') 1 li:~") Six of the thirteen share croppers 
incurred losses which rtuiged fium Rs .  300 ti) R s  1300 of which 5 share croppers had 
engaged in tile 20.80 crul~ shar.ir~g agree~llerll with olle tiirmer under the 50:50 ratio. 
SC:LL 
Outpilt 
Shoring Ratio 
20:80 
33:66 
33:66 
2030 
20:80 
33:66 
20:80 
C:ost 
(Rs.) 
1770 
1346 
618 
135 
1318 
2679 
5 150 
I-'ursoa 
d;i!.s 
92 
5 8  
24 
6 
46 
83 
10 
Output 
(Quintals) 
2.00 
2.21 
2.04 
0.40 
1 .SO 
7.48 
9 00 
Profit 
Per Hectare 
(Rs.) 
-150 
256 
1823 
1375 
-549 
3369 
820 
Gross 
I'rotit 
(Rs . )  
1470 
1 602 
1530 
3 00 
840 
5610 
7200 
Nct Profit 
(Rs.)  
-300 
256 
9 12 
165 
- 478 
293 1 
2050 
87 
Table 6.21: Loss making Share Croppers in C:onlparison to the Landlords - Kherkhedi 
The above table reveals the illecluitnble iiatilre of the 20:80 sliare cropping contract, 
the loss to the share cropper is greater wlieri there is a reduced output as was the case 
during 1999 Rainy. While 7 sl1al.e croppers ii~curred a loss, only two landlords did. In 
the case of the Inore equitable 50 50 colltl.act the loss has been shared equally. The 
loss calculated is only the monrtisecl costs and  does not include the wage labour of the 
share cropper or tlie lalid101.d 
Table 6.22. Soybean Yield ol'l<llrrkl~edi Share Croppers 
2.5 [ 1.8 
Averaye Yield 1 0.99 
& 
C:on.elation betweell Laild Size and Yield = -0.19 
Figure 6.2 
Land Size-Yield Kelatiuaship of Kherkhedi Shire Croppers 
0.12 0.5 0.87 0.87 1 1 1 1 25 1.25 1.25 2 2.5 
Larid Sown size(ha) 
Table 6.23. I-liyl~esr P~.ocit~ctivi~ y 01' 5 Sliare Croppers Kllerkhedi 
+Serial No. Refers to the serial n~lrnbe~.s of hrmers ns used in the previous tables. 
Profit Por 
Hcctarc 
Lntidlord 
(Rs.) 
636 1 
9300 
8 150 
9000 
3467 
Profit per 
Hectare 
Share cropper 
(b.1 
3369 
820 
\Yccd~ilg 
N o  
No 
DAIJ IJcr 
I-lcctal.~ 
(I.;& ) 
172 
60 
50 
0 
100 
SI.' 
No. 
6 
7 
I'U~SOII 
(In! s pcr 
Hcct;~rc 
(Rs.) 
86 
20 
Yicld 
(t hi') 
2.53 
1.80 
Sccds Pcr 
Hcctarc 
(Kg.) 
287 
100 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
100 
8 3 
100 
4 8 
67 
40 
1 1  1.75 
4 
1 3  
1.67 
1.20 
The most productive fitrmer \vho acliieved the yield of2.53 t ha" intensively 
invested in input  of seeds of287 Kg pel 11ecta1.e (the recommended input is 100 Kg. 
Per hectare) and of fertilizers (172 Kg per hectare) The labour input is the highest 
among all farmers at 86 person days per Iiectare. 
Table 6.24: Lowest Prodt~ctivity of Five Sliare croppers Kherkhedi 
*Serial No. Refers to tlie serial nuiiibe~~s of fit~~~iiers as used in tlie previous tables, 
SI.' 
No. 
10 
12 
5 
8 
2 
The productivity of two fitrliis, which did not do weeding operations, are 2.53, 
1.80 t h i '  which is liiyl~es tlla~i tlle average yield of0.99 t ha'' 10.99 hectare of the 
total sown land of 15 81 1iecta1.e was on Ir~.igable land. The average yield of owner 
operated farms ill lesser ;tt U 71 t 11;l.' in  co~nparison to 0.99 t ha". a directly 
attributable factor in the average I'erson days per hectare which is 40 in case of owner 
operated farms in cornl~asisol~ to telialit thrllis where i t  is 53.25. Tile input of DAP per 
hectare is 63.25 Kg, it1 share cropped fits~iis ill comparison to 45.90 in owner operated 
farms. 
Yield 
(T"9 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.60 
0.65 
Sccds t 
bn-' 
(Kg) 
100 
100 
20 1 
50 
100 
Profit 
1u-' 
Share cropper 
(Rs.) 
-1340 
165 
818 
-34 
28 1 
DAP 
ha" 
(Kg) 
100 
SO 
0 
SO 
100 
\Yccdu~y 
NO 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
PDs 
ha-' 
(Rs ) 
70 
5 4 
8 4 
8 2 
5 8 
Protit 
ha"' 
Landlord 
(Rs.) 
- 1340 
658 
-1901 
-86 
556 
Table 6.25: Land Leased in  by Share C:roppers- Kundhankhedi 
Table 6.26: Credit and Labui~l. Transactio~rs wit11 Landlord- Kundhankhedi 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Sharc 
Cropper's 
Name 
Viren Singh 
Ajit Singh 
Papu 
Ram Prasad 
Total 
Works in 
the 
Landlord's 
Own Land 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Dry L:l~id 
(ha) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Shnrc 
Cropper's 
Nane 
Viren Singh 
Azeez Khan 
Papu 
Ram Prasad 
M1liutt 
Rc t~~r~ lcd  
(Kg.) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
A~iiou~it 
Loancd-to 
Lalidlord 
\vitliaut l~itcrest 
0 
3000 
2000 
10000 
Irnynblc 
Lmd 
(112) 
1 25 
3 75 
0 75 
3 75 
0 SO 
\ I  
Borro\\ ccl 
(Kg ) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Amount 
Borro\\cd 
1Rs.I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Own 
Dry Land 
(ha) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I~lrcrcst 
R : I ~  
( 'X I )  
0 
o 
0 
0 
Total 
(ha) 
1 25 
3 75 
0 75 
3 .75  
9 50 
Own 
Irri. 
(ha) 
0 
0 
0 
1.00 
So\v~i III  
Rni~iy 
(ha) 
1.25 
3.75  
0.75 
3.75 
9.50 
91 
Table 627:  Monetised lnp~its  (Totill 0u:lntity) of Share Croppers- Kundhankhedi 
Correlation between Land Size and Feitiliser(DAP) useage = 0.46 
Average Input Per Hectare = 54 73 I<s Pel' I-lectare 
SI. 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Table 6.28: h/lo~re~ised I n p ~ ~ t  ('ost ol'Slrare C:ropper Operated Farms 
*Threshing Ratio: 100: 5 
Average Cost of Clultivi~tio~l. Rs.3867 II:I" 
Average Cost of Cu l t i a~ t io~ i  tbr Lii~idlard: R s  1933,s hi' 
Average Cost of Cultivatia~l f ~ r  Shi~re ('l.opper: R E  19335 ha' 
Total 
Seeds 
(Kg.) 
125 
100 
300 
250 
Sowi~ig  
Hired 
Person days 
0 
6 
0 
0 
Sowil~g 
Hired Tractor 
I4ou1.s 
25 
0 
5 
7 
DAP 
(Kys) 
70 
1 SO 
150 
1 50 
Weeding 
Hired Man 
Days 
0 
0 
26 
40 
Harvesting 
Hired 
Man 
Days 
40 
60 
50 
0 
92 
Table 6.29: Labour Input - O\YII arid Hirctl fo~. Kundankhedi Share Croppers 
Average PDs = 28. l Ot h:~" 
SI. 
NO. 
2 
3 
4 
Correlation between Land Size and Landlord Person days: 0.00 
Correlation between Land Size and Share ('ropper Person days: 0.03 
(Share Cropper PDs = Total I'Ds). 
Own 
Bullock 
1 0  
6 
0 
0 
Table 6 30 La~ltllol,tl O L I I J J L I ~  slial-eKundhanklledi 
Wccd 
0\ui  
10 
0 
0 
0 
Average protit = Rs.693 II:~.' 
Benefit Cost Ratio = 1 35 
Landlord PDs : O 00 113'' 
Correlation betweell Lalld Size tuld La~ltllurtl I'e~,son days 0.00 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Wccd 
H~rcd 
0 
0 
26 
40 
SC:LL 
Output 
Si~arinq Ratio 
5O:SO 
SO: 50 
50:50 
5O:SO 
tla~.\cst 
O\\n 
5 
4 
0 
32 
Cost 
(Ks.) 
2412.5 
4885 
4071 5 
6449 
~ I . I I . \ C S I  
Hlrcd 
40 
60 
5 0 
0 
Total 
PDs 
55 
64 
76 
72 
PCII.SO 
I I S  
0 
0 
0 
0 
Nct Profit 
( Rs .) 
137.5 
55 15 
1003.5 
-74 
S.C:. 
O\va 
Labour 
15 
10 
0 
32 
Profit 
Pcr Hectare 
(Rs.) 
110 
1471 
1338 
-20 
0i111~1i 
(()tls) 
3 
I3 
7.5 
8.5 
Gross 
Outpt~t 
(Rs.) 
2550 
10400 
562.5 
6375 
S.C 
PDs 
55 
64 
76 
72 
Person 
days 
hri' 
44 
17 
10 1 
19.2 
Table 6.3 1 Soybean Y irld ot'l<undhankIledi Share Croppers 
Correlation between Land size and yield = -0.62 
SI. No. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
Average Yield 
Diagram 6.3 
Relationsllip between Land Size and Productivity among 
I<undl~anlthedi SI~are Croppers 
Land Size(Hi1) 
1.25 
3.75 
0 . 7 5  
3 .75  
3 75 0.75 
Land Sown Sizs(ha) 
Yield ( t  ha") 
0.48 
0.69 
2.00 
0.45 
0.9 1 
Table 6.32: Sbase Cropper - O t l t p ~ ~ t  Slnre- Kundhankhedi 
Share Cropper B:C: Ratio: 1.35 
Average Profit = Rs.693 Iin-I 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Table 6.33: lnpttt Intensity ot' Klierkhedi Share Croppers 
SC:LL 
h t p l l l  
Sl~Vi~ig 
Rnlio 
5050 
5050 
50:50 
50:50 
6.4 Shnre Cru1)l)ers- S I I I I I I I I ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  Ilrst lls ;II I ( I  Al i~lysis 
Table 6.34: Lntld Holdins - Sliiire Cropper Operated Farms 
SI.' 
No. 
4 
1 
4 
3 
(Rs.1 
2412.5 
---- 
4885 
4621.5 
6449 
Yield 
(t ha-') 
0.45 
0.48 
069  
2.00 
PDs 
01\11 
10 
14 
0 
32 
Sample 
Size 
20 
13 
4 
3 9 
Sccds 
113.' 
(Kg 1 
100 
8 0 
267 
80 
Sown 
1999 
30.5 
16,24 
9.5 
56.24 
PDs 
Htlcd 
80 
120 
76 
40 
Total 
33.75 
16.24 
9.5 
59.49 
DAP 
11.1 
( I ; ~  1 
56 
40 
200 
-10 
Irriyable 
3.5 
10.99 
9.5 
2j.00 
O ~ I I ~ I ~ I ~  
(Oils) 
3 
13 
7 5 
8.5 
Dry  
-30.25 
5.25 
0.00 
35.5 
SL. 
No, 
1 
2 
3 
\ I / c c d ~ ~ ~ y  
Yes 
N o  
Yea 
Ye\ 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundl~ankliedi 
Total 
Cmss 
O I I I ~ I I  
(KF )  
2550 
10400 
5625 
6375 
NCI 
Prolil 
(Rs 
137.5 
5515 
1003.5 
-74 
Profit 
ha-' 
Share cropper 
(h.) 
496 
2423 
-7 16 
1241 
P D s  
11:1.l 
100 
5 1 
I01 
5 1 
Protit 
lin" 
Ln~ldlord 
(Rs  ) 
496 
2423 
-716 
124 1 
Prolil 
(Rs.) Iu' 
110 
1471 
1338 
-20 
Total 
S.C. 
PDs 
69 
33 
42 
20 
Table 6-35 Correlstio~ls between Li i~l~l  Size and Variables (Share Croppers) 
Table 6.30. Average of Variables- (Land Lord) 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
Table 0.37 Ave~agt: ol'\'i~~.iablrs- (Land Lord)-corttinued 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
Average 
SI. 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
Fc111Irst.s ilje 
-0 45 
-0 03 
0 46 
-0 32 
Vi1l;rgc 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhan. 
Cosl ol' 
C I ~ I I I I I I  
(Ks. J 
28 13 
4452 24 
3867 
Loss Amount 
(Rs.) 
5 167 
1780 
74 
702 1 
Lalld Lord I'Ds 
-0 16 
-0 13 
0.00 
-0.37 
L:IIIC~ Lorcl 
C'OSI 
(Rs.) 
1720 
278 1.40 
1933 5 
Loss Making 
La~tdlords 
5 
2 
I 
8 
SI. No. 
I 
2 
3 
Share Cropper 
PDs 
-0.57 
0.44 
0.42 
-0.5 1
Village 
Jaoti 
Kl~erkhedi 
Ku~tdhnnkhedi 
Total 
PDs 
Iln' I 
(Rs.) 
2 U 
2 .  IX 
0.0 
Yicld 
( t  
0.54 
0.99 
0.66 
B-C 
Ratio 
1.28 
2.01 
1.35 
Grots 
O~lput 
Slrnn 
(t h i 1 )  
0.36 
0.74 
0.33 
Profit 
(Rs.) 
833 
2930 
693 
Table 6.38 Average ol'V;i~~iiibles- Te~ia~icy (Share Cropper) 
Table 6.39. Averaye u f  Variables- l ' e~~ancy (Sliare Cropper)-continued 
SI. 
No 
1 
2 
- - 
3 
Table 6.40: Loss Incur~td by Lu~ldlortls arlti Sllare Croppers i~nder different 
conlr~aclunl i11,ranyements 
Villilyc 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
A\ cr;igc 
Con 01' 
C I I I I I I I I  
(Rs.) 
28 13 
4552.24 
3867 
Villaye 
Jnoti 
KIierkIirdi 
Kundlia~~kl~etli 
Total 
Share Croppers(Nos) 
5 
4 
3 
12 
Contractual Arra~igenient 
20:80 
33-66 
SO-SO 
Total 
sl1;lrc 
I '  
('US( 
(Its.) 
1087 
177 1.49 
3 
Loss making Sliare 
Croppers 
5 
6 
I 
12 
La~~dlord(Nos) 
I 
5 
2 
Y 
Loss Amount 
(Rs.) 
3032 
3873 
74 
6979 
P c r s u ~ ~  
tl;~!s 
Pcr 
I-lccl;~rc 
24 
20 
34 
B-C 
fii~lio 
1.35 
1.59 
2.24 
Yicld 
(I II;\.~) 
0.54 
0.99 
0.66 
Gross 
Output 
1 ~ 1 - l  
0.18 
0.24 
0.33 
Profit 
(Rs.) 
133 
258 
693 
Productivity 
The average soybean productivity is 0.68 t 11n.l lnarginally lesser than owner 
operated farm (0.72). The averuge protluctivity ill the three villages of Jaoti, 
Kherkhedi ar~d Kundtlankhedi i ~ ~ r  o 54, LI 00 tllid 0 66 t 113". The variations and the 
differential input intensities brttveerl tlie li~yliest prodt~ctive and lowest productive in 
the Jaoti and Kherkhedi are as follows. 
The highest productivity of 1 05 t 11:1" in Jnoti i~lvolved an input of 41 Kg. of 
DAP per hectare conil~al.ed to i\n avesilge of36 5 Kg. t'or the village and the labour 
input of 29 person days II:I-I .  Tlie lowest productivity of 0. I6 t ha" involved a higher 
input intensity of 80 Kg of [>A[' t !in.' and labot~r input of 49 person days t b'. 
Therefore the siy~iiticalit variable rlrtel.nii~iiliy tlie soybean productivity. is the water 
logging potentiality of tile land, altlioi~gh i n p u t  practices do play a important role as 
the evidence of higher productivity aniclilg IC'RISAT trial farmers. 
In Kherklledi sliare C S O P I ) ~ I . S ,  tlie Iligllest productivity of 2.53 t ha'' is the 
highest yield both amoily O \ Y I I ~ I .  ol)ei.nled I';l~.~iis a~id sliare cropped farms. The input 
intensity on tlie 0 87 liecta~ts I ; I I I ~  per. Iiec~a~e \ i tas 
Seeds : 287 Kg, (the ~~eco~~l~iie~icled input  is I O U  Kg.) 
DAD : 172 Ky. 
Weeding : Not dolie 
Person days . 86 (Iiighest i\lIlolig the share croppers, the 
itvei.aye is 56. I6  person days). 
The lowest yield of 0.40 t li:il i n  I O U  liecti~rr liss ill1 illput of seeds at the rate of 100 
Kgs of seeds l m '  of SO Kg, of' DAP ILI.', 111) weedins and person days of 70 days t hi'. 
The average profit t i~r tlie Landlords is Rs 494, 2672 and 693 compared to 
Share croppers at Rs 376, 13 1 and 693 thr Jaoti, Kllerkhedi and Kundhankhedi 
respectively Tlie protitiibility ill i i l l  t llr cilses uf  tllc landlord is liiyller This is despite 
the non-inclusian at' tlic ~a~~l-~iloileiise~I l l ~ i ~ t  costs of the sh;rre cropper(cost of the 
labour by the sbreaoppel. all(! his i i ~ l l l i l y  iiiiul-eit 1111 the pmductioo loans incurred 
by the share cropper). wiiicll dc~iionsr~~o~rs tlie exploitative nature of the share 
cropping contracts. 8 L;indloi~ds i~icul.~*ed a luss of Rs.7021 compared to 12 share 
croppers who inc~~rred a loss of 607t1 IJ~ltier the 20:SO contract while 5 share croppers 
incurred a loss, only one landlusd Ilnd ii loss ~ttlectiily the inetluitable nature of the 
contract. In the 33 66 contrnct. 5 lantllosds i111ci 4 share croppers incurred a loss. Under 
the 5050 contract, 2 1a1idloi.d~ ir~ld 3 sllarr cruppers incurred a loss. 
Land Size-Productivity I<ttlatio~lsllij~ 
The relatio~ishil> is foiind to be inverse with a conelation of -0.30. The 
correlation for Jauti. Kllerkl\ccli and l<u~~~ l I~~ l lk l l ed i ( s i~~ l~ lde  size-4) ar -0.30 and - 
0.19 -0.62. 
Feflilisers-Land Size f~eli~tionslli~ 
The is inversely reliited with a correlation of -0.32. The 
amlation for Jiiofi and Kl\r~.kllrdi il1.e -0.45 md -0.03 respectively whereas for 
Kundhankhedi it in posilively ci)r~eli~ted at 046 ( ~ l l l p l e  size-4)~ 
Labour-Land Size-Yield IieI;itio~lsIlil~ 
The t.elationship betwee11 la~itl o ~ ~ i  i)cr.son doys arid land size is inverse with a 
correlation of -0.37, the relationsliip is i~ive~.se tbr SIii11.e cropper 11iay days also at a 
correlation of -0.5 1 .  
In Jaoti, two share croppers Iiired out both weeding and harvesting operations 
(SI.No.1 and 2). while two fa1.11iel.s hired out harvesting operations and one farmer 
hired out weeding operiitio~is.. I I of the 20 sliiire croppers have hired-in-labour during 
the peak harvest seasoris as the \vork has to be accomplislled in  a short period of time. 
The farmers who did nut tlo \veedi~~g, SI 110. 2, 4, 8, 15, 16 and 17 had an yield of 
0.56, 0.36, 0.20, 0.33, 0.04 and 0.40 t II;I" wit11 four of tlie size farmers having a yield 
lesser than the average ot' 0.51 t I I ~ ' .  111 I<herkhedi, only olle farmer hired out the 
harvesting operations (SI N o  i O )  i111tl t\vo ditl 11ot \vreding operations (SI. No. 6 and 
7) had an yield of 2.53 arld I .SO t I I : ~ "  \vllicl~ co~itrastir~gly is tlie lrighest yield among 
all the share croppers. 111 I < i i ~ l r l l i ; ~ ~ i k l l ~ c l i ,  Oil(: ti11.111e1. \vhu did not do weeding (SI. No. 
2)'had an yield of 0.60 r II:I I lower t l i ; i ~ i  the iivel.age yield of 0.91 t b", one farmer 
hired out the lia~.vestirig upe~~ntio~is (SI I I U .  3 ) .  
Rudra (1976) ir~iitlysing ils tu \vliy ~ 1 1 1 i t l l  Ihrmers hire-in labour puts forth three 
plausible explanatiorls - ( i )  Caste plays all i~npo~ ta~ l t  ro e and the manual work is not 
done by certain castes (ii) No avi~iliibility ot' adult members and ( i i i )  Need for more 
labour to coliiplete the wor.1; ill a c e ~ ~ t i t ~ ~ i  pe~.iod of time, especially in harvesting (iv) 
Labour locking (share cropper llas to work in  the landlord's own land. especially 
during the peak periods) w11l1 tlie l i i i l ~ l l ~ r i l  \ v ~ t l i  wllom a credit loan for consumption 
or productiotl has bee11 tirken 
m r l ~ c k i n g  - Transactions 
The cash ;uid kind loans (\vliear) itre ~nc~rrred by tlte tenant at the sowing 
period in July and the I i~~ id l~ rd  pays back the tmnnt's sliare after deducting tho 
principal in afler the tliresliiny al)n.stions is co~rlpleted in November. The interest 
chlged is 3GYa on cash l a ~ o s  I n  J i i i l t i  villnye. I0 of the 20 share croppers borrowd 
c s ~ h  ofwhich four off them also bul~rowrd wheiit. One share cropper lent Rs. I500 t~ 
the landlord for which no interest is cllo~,ged (50 50 contract). Two share croppers 
only borrowed wlleat. Tllrec sbarc cruppers report working on the landlord's own 
operated land of wliich two wosked without getting wages In  Kherkhedi, four of the 
13 share croppers repo~ted bo~.l.owing botll C. , ~ j  ;I 1 and wheat from the landlords and 
three of them report wurkrlig 011 the landlo~.rls ow11 larid In Kunkhankhedi where all 
the four share croppers lliivtt engaged ill  tllr 50 50 contsact, thee  of them loaned Rs. 
3000, Rs. 2000 and Rs 10.000 to the la~ldlord \vithoirt interest. Among the share 
croppers, the labour locking with 1n11dlo1-d Ilas bee11 tbt~nd weak, two share croppers in 
the case of Jaoti, three in  the case of Kllerklledi a~ld none in  the case of Kundhankedi 
although borrowing for production ;111d corlsurnption loons is relatively stronger. 
6.4 COMPARISON OF O\\'NEIt OPERATED FARMS WITH SHARE 
CROPPED FARMS 
Jaoti Village 
The total laritl suw~l by the 18 owner opesated fiirms i n  Jaoti village was 3 1.22 
hectares of w11icI1 30 63 I l e ~ t i ~ ~ e  \V;IS Ir~'~gi~ble land whereas the 20 sharecroppers 
cultivated 30 5 llecttues of Inrltl 01' \ Y I I I C I I  or11y 3 5 llcctares Tlie input intensity as 
expected is iligller ill tile 1 1  riyablc I : ~ ~ l t l  ( o \ i  rler ope~.ated) fi1r111s. The correlation 
between land size a~lrl DAI' i~l~plrcation 1s pusit ive but nut siy~iificant in owner 
operated farms (0 22) wileleas i t  is ~lryative i n  rlle case of share croppers (-0.45). The 
average 18bour input is 27 61 pesson Dilys ha'' in  owner operated farms in 
comparison to a ma~.yi~lal lesser 26 19 prsson dnys ill sllnre cropped farms. The cost of 
cultivation per hectare is Rs 3 100 i n  ow~ler. operated t'drms in comparison to tenant 
operated farllis it was lesser a t  Ks ?S 13 Tile itveiage pri~fit in owner operated farms is 
RS. 2636 colnpil=d to [(s 966 ill ,Il;lre cropl~etl fi~sms The diifcrential in soybean 
yield is substantial, 0.78 ( hi,.' ill owln. upei*i~ted thrltls in C O I T I ~ ~ ~ ~ S O I I  f0 0.54 L h' in 
rhm cropper opmtrd fi~sl~ls Tile correli~tio~r between land size and yield is negative 
at -0.27 and -0.30 respectively. 
The total sown area of tlle 12 ownel. operated tirms is 2 1.24 hectares which is 
entirely irriyable. in C O I I I ~ ~ \ ~ ~ S ~ > I I  ;111lu11g the 13 slii~re croppers 10.99 of the 15.81 
hectares is lrriyable. Tlle correliltio~l betweell laad size and DAP is positive (0.08) in 
the case of owner farms but not sip~iiticiinl co~npared to a negative correlation among 
the share croppers (-0.03) The cost oI'cultivi~~ion per hectare in owner operated farms 
is Rs. 4035 compared to Its 4452 21 io slii1r.e cropped farms, the investment of labour 
is also lower at 40 days per hectare i n  ownel operated fiinns in comparison to 57.52 
days among share croppers The p~'otit 1s Its 2-144 lie" and Rs 3 188 ha" respectively. 
The higher profit in shilre croppet1 tirr~l~s i  due to tlie hiyller yield, 0.99 t hav' 
compared to 0.7 1 t \la'' aniony tlie sliare c~opl,e~.s Tlie con-elation between land size 
and yield is neyative at -0 38 111 owrler. oper.ated t:,~rnls in comparison to -0.19 in share 
cropped farms. 
Kundhankhedi Villace 
The total sow11 area ut' the 9 o\vlier operated farms is 20 hectares which is 
lrrigable in comparison to 4 sliare crol)pc~.s wllo leased-in 9.5 liectsres of Irrigable 
land. The correlation bct~vee~i laird s ~ z c  illid DAP is positive iu the case of owner 
operated farms ( R' = O 30). :111d 511:11.e C ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ) C I . S ( R ~  = O 46) bi~t 11ot significant. The 
investment of labour is iS 45 lia" 111 c(1se ot' owner uperated farms in comparison to 
lower input of 28.10 1ii1.l alnolle ,liii~e cruppers The cost of cultivation among 
owner operated brnis is Ks 3285 11ii.l i l l  ci)~ilpa~.iso~i t  Rs 3867 l i t  in share cropper 
operated farms. The yield is l l i ~ l ~ e ~ .  all,ullp tlie sI1a1.e croppers at 0.91 T""' compared 
to 0.66 TI"" . I t  is however irllpo~tan~ to realise tllat the sample is 4 share croppers 
compared to 9 owllrr operated trr~iis and the i.esults tlave ti1 be interpreted with 
wtion as the sample size is s~iii~lle~. (The tl>t i~l  sainyle of the village constitutes the 
total populatiotl of the villi~ge) 
Table 6.4 1 Compiirisu~~ betwro~ Owller Operated and Share Cropped Farms 
The above table provides e\:iderlce to slio\v t l ia t  tlie input intensities of tenant 
operated farrns lleed not be lesser 1l1a11 owllcr. ope~.ntcd t:,lr-nis as irsually documented 
in the literature. On the contrary siy~iitic;i~it dit't'erentiiils have been found. In the case 
of person days per Ilectare, i t  i s  3 1.78 conipared to 2 1.22 i n  owner operated farms. 
The differential i n  fertiliscr i n p i ~ t  is sig~iifica~~t wit11 tlie input being more than double 
in share cropper operated tiir.rlls. 'The cost of cultivation of share cropper operated 
farms is marginally higllel. tI1;iii O \ Y I I ~ I .  ~ ~ e ~ . i ~ t t d  titr~ils . whereits the profit per hectare 
is higher by Rs.272 in owner ope~.atctl ti\r~ns. The ditt'erentials i n  the average land size 
are not too signiticant. 'The average la~rd suwn is 1.73, 1.77 and 2.22 among owner 
operated farms in Jaoti, Kllerkl~cdi and Kur1dhankl1edi respectively compared to 1.52. 
1.21 and 2.37 ainong s1ln1.e cropper operated farms 
Owner 
Operated 
Farms 
Share 
Cropper 
Operated 
- Farms 
The reasotl for [he Iiigl~e~. I J I I ) L I ~  illte~isi~y ill ~l1i11.e cropj~ed farms could be due 
to the incentive stlucttl~es i>1'111c C ' O I I ~ I . ~ I C I L I ~ ~ ~  ill ~il ige~llellt TIlirly of the share croppers 
ensaged either i n  a 33 60 or 5 0 . 5 0  cotit~.itct, tllr input cost of seeds and fertilizers are. 
borne upfront by the landlord 1\w \vllicli the tenant has to pay an illrerest (either 33% 
or 543% of the costs). I t  is tIler.efor-t? J.iltiollid ibr the landlord to invest more inputs, if 
the output is higher, particrllarly in tlie 3 3 : G G  contract, greater returns would accrue ta; 
him. If the returns are poorer as was the case i r t  the 1899 rainy season, the tenant har 
to pay the interest on the prodrictioll inputs (seeds and fertilisers) and since the inw 
Avcmyc 
Cost of 
Cultivntior1 
(Rs.) 
3320 
3443 
Awr:tgu 
Bc~lufrt 
C:ost ICatio 
I .6-3 
1.54 
Avur;tyc 
IJrofit 1la.I 
( ~ s . 1  
2045 
Avcr~tyc 
Yield ha-' 
(t llii*') 
0.72 
1773 
Avcrnye 
13crson 
Days 
( t  ha'') 
2 1.22 
Average ' 
DAP 
(Kg ha") 
19.81 
3 1.78 46.76 
i 
intensity is higherl pania~iarly u t. tkn iliser, the landlord gains through greater interest 
m i n g s .  The above a~.go~ne~it is suppor[eci ti-0111 the following evidence of the 
landlords under the 20:80 clllltl'ilct i.he inpl~t cost (of reeds and fenilisers) is borne by 
the landlord and the data film Klierkllrdi villiige reveals that the average investment 
of fertilisers is less when \lie landlo~d i i ~ l l y  br;~rs the cost- the input of landlords under 
the 20:80 contract was - 0 (4). (45). 60(7).  60(9), SO( 1 I ) ,  5 0  l I )  Kg ha*' , and in all 
the cases the input is lehser t11ii11 llir ilverilgi. Iilr the Klielkhedi share croppers at 63.25 
Kg ha- he nunlber il l  tile b~.i~ckets ~t t i l . s  111 t l~e serial numbel- of the share cropper in 
Kherkhedi). 
The contracts entered inlo are not sacrosalict and due to the unequal bargaining 
power, a reduced output would be illterpreted by the landlord lias lack of effort by the 
share cropper and reduced share would be given to hi~n. 
The profit rate of owner ol~e~.ateil ILrmers being higher than the landlords who 
leased-out land gives support tbs tllr argilluelit nlnde by rlre share croppers that poorer 
quality land is leased out. The evidence in terms clt' protitability suggest that if the 
land was of better quality, the lundlu~d would pret'er to cultivate it on his own. 
However one also ~ieeds ti) cunside~. ~ l i a t  the p~,olitability for the landlord is not just 
restricted to the ~llo~~etisttd ~.tttilrl~s L ) I I  t l i ~  1.01) o~lrl>i~t, estl.ii illc0111e is earned from the 
interest charged to the sl1i11.e crol,l>c~., Tlic ~lla~imization of his leisure especially 
under the 33:66 and 50:SO COII I I .~ ICLS \vllerei~l all the ol)erations are leased-out adds to 
the profitability of the contract. Tlle ;lryi~me~lt p~.oposed by Bl~aduri (1973) of the 
landlords exploiting the trniilits tl~souyll L I S L I I . ~  anti they beilly more interested in 
higher income through the money Iel~di~ly tllitn hiplier o~~ tpe t s  which would reduce the 
dependence on the landlords still relnains rekvant. 
The ICRISAT trial hrmers have been able to achieve a 52. 8% higher yield, 
1.1 t h i 1  , compared 111 ilii ilvcl.iige yield 0.72 t hi<' i n  the three ~ttldy villages, but 
have not been able tu esciipe tile \vitter 1i)ggilig pmblem and the land size-yield 
relaion,hip is also tbulal illverse (-0 30 ) .  Tlir inverse relationship between land 
and pduct ivi ty  rmliii~ls bath alliuog tile owlxi. apemted and the share cropped far 
Md the evidence presented here is ildditional evide~lce to prove the endemic natur 
&ismlationship in Indian yriculture. 
The additional benefits ILI tllc landlorrl is that the s~~pervision costs are lesser 
under a share cropping cuntracts iis tile i~ice~itive tbl the share cropper to work hardr  
is greater. This is due to tlir ioerli~iti~ble lliltiirr of the contracts, which requires a 
higher output to be reslised tbr the iraliralian of sufticient returns. which would 
enable him to atleast, earn the wage 1sbou1- costs f i r  him and his family. The penalty 
clause is another etliially deternli~~i~lg ti~ctor tbr a greater effort. 
Table 6.42 : Co~npositioi~ of Dry la~~cl ;111ri I~.rig;~ble and among the Owner Operated 
and share C'~.oppetl Farms 
Table 6.43: Comparative Yield ol'C)\vller Operated f-ar.111~ vis-a-vis Share Croppers 
Number of the 
Village 
Jaoti 
Kherkhedi 
Kundhankhedi 
Total 
1 Name of the Village ] Owner Ol)e~.ated Farms 1 Share Cropped Farms 1 
Kherkhed i 
Kundhankhedi 
Average 0.72 
Shal-c (:l.ol)pt.d 
Jaoti 
The ditTerentinl i n  ~ )~ .od~~c t iv~ ty  bet\veen the owner operated farms and share 
cropped far~ns is not sub~ ta~~ t~ i i l .  0 72 t bii' in comparison to 0.68 t ha". The 
proportion of'dry laiid aliiang the sllilrr cropped fiirms is 72.90%. while among owner 
opmred  farms dry land is u~lly 5 85 i t  is 011ly considering this the yield differentials 
are quite minimal, AltI\ou~h in  tile 1 C ) O O  i.i~iny seiison. the problem was of excess 
rainfall. the quality of tile latld is better to lrriyi~ted land. In most of the dry land. the 
pelt-rainy seasoti crop. wllcat is coltiv;~ted i111d ill  the railly season it is I& i 
uncultivated, The hip\l input intessity in trrnis of laboiir and frrtiliser application i~ 
the share cropped have been the determinants in achieving n yield close to o m  
D1.y (t-la) 
27.00 
13 .O1) 
0.00 
40.69 
Owner Operated 
I~'rigi\bie (I-la) 
3.50 
2.12 
0.50 
15.12 
Dry ( H a )  
0.00 
1.5 
2.5 
4.0 
Ave~.ayr Yield (T""") 
0 7X 
lrrigabie (Ha) 
3 1.22 
19.74 
17.50 
68.46 
Average Yield (T'~") 
0.54 
The results of this study pi.ovide ei~iilelice 011 the varhtion ill productivity across 
farms caused due to ~ i~ tu l , loyp in~  Tlir \.i~l.ii~bility ill the pt.odilctivity of Soybean 
strengthens the risk-aversive belinvioui of' the Il~rmers, more in tlie case of the dry 
land farmers, wliicl~ leads to IIOII-ol~tinil~rn inpitt allocation.The study provides 
empirical support to tlie 'nionito~.ing' eppr.oucll of Clieung (1969), the landlords 
stipulate and effectively monitor sllare cruppers activities and provides evidence of 
the resulting urieqiiitable distribiition of olrtp~~t , 'credit-locking' of the tenant which 
strengthens the bargainilly power ot'tlle larldlord in  deciding tlie output share contract. 
6.6 IMPLICATIONS 01: LO\\' I'I~0I)IJC:TIVITY UNDER A LIBERALISED 
TRADE R E C l h l E  
The average productiviry  ti^ Iildia for the year 1999-2000 was 0.94 t ha" 
compared to 1 75 t ha" in (:\litla. 1 4 5  r 1,i1" i n  U.S A, and 3. 12 t ha" in the European 
Union compare to 0.93 l lla" in  I~ltl iu 
In February, 1905 i \ l l ~ i l ) ~ t  id1 the edible oils have bee11 put under the Open 
General License with ill1 ir~lport rlirty of 30%, i n  July 1998 it was reduced to 15%. 
however receiltly on Nove~nber 2 I", 2000 this Ilas been again increased to 35% with 
demand coming tiom indi~stsy ti>s ps~)tecrion. The lower productivity of soybean, 
particularly Irrigated ~l>ybeil~l I I ~ I S  cixt i~nl~lici~ticl~ls because of the higher subsidy on 
it, ICRlSAT (1999) estilllate~l t h a t  tile subsicly per hectare on Irrigated soybean is 
estimated at Rs  2091 per I1rctiu.e colllpare to Rs. 963 for rainfed soybean. The 
subsidy compollrllt illcludcs tile subsidy on tertilisers alotie with the subsidy on the 
credit. It is estimated that i f '  u l l  t l~e s~~bsitlics were abolished, the profitability of 
lhgated Soybean would by 48% ilncl lliis \vuold induce ;I shift away from the 
crop. 
The private and social g~.otiiability ut' soybean as esti~rlated by ICRISAT 
(1999) is as follows: 
Table 6.44: Private and Social I'rolitability of Soybeall 
Source: Typology Cot~str~lction arid Ecunomic I'olicy Analysis for Sustainable 
Rainfed Ayricult~rre. (ICRISAT, I9C)9, P. 62). 
lrrigable 
Rain fed 
Average 
It is therefore argued that  
"since this zone (zane 0. ~~icluding M P ) is dominated by a crop that is 
inetticient in lesousce use i111d low ill yel~es;~ting social returns, it seems that 
policies that correct t i ~  tlisto~-rru~ls i l  tlal~~estic prlces would have their desired 
effect, i e a sllifi a\viiy t1.onl Soybeii~l towiuds sorghum, liiaize and pigeonpea 
to achieve this ~ilust be qtralitied if soybean possesses specific double-crop 
advantages relative to other ra iny seii.4on-crops" (ICRISAT. 1999, P. 68). 
Private Pl.utit 
(Jis.) 
33 89 
6390 
6150 
I t  is however illrporta~~t to twlise that a pro-active strategy focused on 
improving the productivity of soybeall has a yrenter scope for welfare enhancement, 
as the private profitability ot'the c u p  is I~iyl~er compared to the above crops. However 
this should not be at the cost of rlticirncy, ti ~~radiral redtrction in subsidies, 
particularly of fertilisers is \va~.ra~t(ed (a large pa17 of the si~bsidy is a producer 
subsidy. in effect the il~etliciency of the public Sector units and private Sector units 
are being subsidised, freer ilnport.'i \ \ ~ o L I I ~ I  I C S L I ~ ~ S  i t ]  ~lleir procurenlent at a lesser cost). 
This calls for not ot~ly proyraltlllics lbs i111l~rovilly t l~c manayernent practice 
increasing prodtrcrivity but irlso wjtler r.eti)r~ns in the rural t'actor markets in c 
insurance and in the land rnarkrts ttlatirty to leasing. Retbrms. particularly rela 
leaging are discussed i n  the Policy chapter. 
Social Profit 
(Rs.) 
- 1  129 
230 
-109 
- 
Subsidies per Hectare 
(Rs.) 
209 1 
903 
d 
SUhIMARY, IJOLIC\' IR4I'LICATIONS AND 
REC0MMENL)ATlONS 1'0 THE STAKEHOLDERS 
7.1 SUMMARY 
The yield of tlie owne~.-ope~.ated tii1.1~1~ are marginally higher at 0.78 t ha" in 
comparison to share cropper operated thrnls \which have an average yield of 0.68 t ha' 
I. The yield of owner operated fitrlns in Jaoti and Kiindllankhedi villages is higher 
than share cropped farnis wliereas in the case of Klierkhedi. the yield of owner 
operated farlns is lesser tliitn s1ia1.e cropped t3rlns (0.7 1 t ha" cornpared to 0.99 t ha" 
of share cropped farms) Tlie inveslnle~~t of labour however is lesser in owner 
operated farms (40 person days ha" conlpitrecl 10 57.52 person days ha-' days among 
share croppers). In Kt~~idliilllklledi village, yield of both types of farmers are the same 
at 0.66 t ha-'. 
It needs to be e ~ ~ i p l ~ i ~ ~ ~ z c d  that  itnlullg [lit. ownel. operated Farms only 4.0 of the 
total 72.46 hectares sow11 is uni~rigatud c o ~ ~ s ~ i t t ~ t i ~ i y  5 52% of i~nirigated land in 
comparison to s11a1.e clup[>er i>l)e~.iitetl I ~ I I . I I ~ \  \wI~ere 40 69 of tlie total sown area of 
55.81 is unirrigated co~~stituti~lg 72 00% ol'tlie lalid Altliough, the problem faced by 
the farmers in the 1090 rainy seasan was 01' excess rain and the consequent water 
logging, generally dry land is i~secl ollly tbl. olie crop in the post-rainy season and rest 
of the year it is left tillow Tlie yro\ving ut'suybeiin under rainfed land is considered 
is not perceived as a good proposition, ill  thvuur of an assured post rainy season crop. 
The correlation between land size illid yield has been found negative in all the 
cases, except Kundliankhetli o w ~ ~ e r  operii~ed t8rme1.s (0.27, sample size - 4.. among 
the share croppers it is -0.02). I n  Jaoti, alnony owner operated farmers it is -0.27 
ampwed to -0.30 alnony share crops wlztreas in Kherkhedi, it is -0.38 and -0.14%' 
rapsctivdy. with rlw sl~are croppers I~aGi~ly a lesser nwt ive  corralation duo to 
*id. 
The cost of cultivatio~~ is I~iglie~. itniully the owner operated farms in Jaoti 
(Rs.3 100 in comparison to Rs.28 I3 iilllolly share croppers) and Kherkhedi, and 
Kundhankhedi the cost of cultivatio~i of'sllitre croppers is marginally hiyher (Rs. 4552 
compared to Rs. 4035 arld Rs. 3867 co~npared to Rs.3285) respectively. The profit for 
owner operated farms in colnparison to leased-out f1u.m~ is as follows. 
The profit per Iiectare is hiyher alllong owner operated farms in Jaoti [Rs. 
2636 compared to Rs. 966 aliiorlg share croppers (taking the average profit of 
landlords and share croppers)] and Kundhat~kliedi (Rs.3285 in comparison to 
Rs.1386) in Khel-khedi the tenant operated t"lrms have a higher profit (Rs. 3188 
compared to Rs. 2444 elllorig ownel' oper.itted t:ll1.1~1~) . The profit of the tenants in all 
cases have been lesser t h i t ~ l  tlie lalldlords, rn Jaoti (Rs 133 per hectare compared to 
Rs.833) and Kherkhed~ (Ks 2030 couipared to Rs 258) whereas in Kundhankhedi 
both have an equal profit v f  Ks GO3 per Iiecti~re (50 50 contract). While 8 landlords 
incurred loss amounting tu Ks 702 1 ,  I2 rlli~l.e croppers incurred a loss of Rs.6979. 
The evidence from the st~ldy suggests tlint, tlre i~iput intensity has been higher in the 
case of share cropped ti~rlns tbr boll1 labour (3 1.78 person days l~a" in share cropped 
farms compared to 2 1.22 persoli days ha" in owner operated thrms) and Fertiliser, 
(46.76 kgs among sliare c1.oppel.s cu~nyured to 19.8 1 kys arnony owners). This is due 
to the nature of the contract, wllerrill tl1el.e is strict supel-vision fkom the landlord who 
also gains fro111 interest earniligs due to all l~iglier investment (either 50 or 33% costs 
are borne by the tenant) 
The more impo~.tnnt vi11.iilbles Iiave been the waterlogging potentiality of land 
and the quality of land. The lesser. pl.oIit pel. I~e~tare  lease-in by the share croppers has 
been primarily due to tile unecluiil ~tiiture ol' the share cropping contract, the yield 
differentials not being sig~iitica~~tly Ili lter. 'l'lit. 1C:RISAT trial filrmers have been able 
to achieve an tliglier yield of I I t hit" i l l  tlre I000 season btit Iiave not been able to 
escape the water logging p~oble~n it d tlie land size-yield relationship is also found 
inverse (-0.39). 
The inverse relationship between laud size and prodt~ctivity remains both 
unona the owner operated i~tld tlir slinre cropped fir~ns and the evidnoe pres8ntsd' 
is additional evidence to prove rile endemic nature of this relationship in ind- 
P 
&culture. The emergence of the newer fornls of share cropping contract (3356 8LEEr 
20:80) provides additional evidence on tlie exploitative nature of the share cropping 
contracts. 
7.2 Policy Implicntioes 
The policy suyyestions put tbrth in the literatilre to reduce the inverse 
relationship between Iatid size and productivity iiiclude, itnposition and enforcement 
of land ceiling, and transfer of ownership right to tenants (Junankar, 1976) 
accompanied by provision of factor inpcrts (Chrnia, 1985). The recent studies suggest 
that the evidence in entbrcenient of' li~lld ceiling itnd in  redistributing land has been 
poor, ceiling laws have, in  it11 except three states. transferred less than I % of 
agricultural area to the target group. Loopl~oles in the law allowed the bulk of 
landlords to nvoid expl-opriation by distributing surplus land to relations and 
dependents (APPLI, 1996, Mearns, 1097). 
A important area whet.ein t.cti)t.i~i liiis to progress at a fdster pace is in rural 
credit sector, where NAMAKC) hiis startrcl 11) play ;I pro-active role in promoting and 
strengthening Self Help gruups (St-I(;\) l'llis process Iliis to be strengthened and 
enhanced to reduce tlie ~narket i~lll,e~.tiicriu~is in the credit niarket and help the 
farmers, tenants atid Ii~tldlrss 1aboirl.ers i l l  i~ccessing credit at reasonable rates of 
interest. This would help i n  reducir~g tlie 11ri)blem of ittider investment of inputs in 
agriculture. The guidelines oti this issue Iiave been formulated under the 'Common 
Principles for Waterslied Developinent" by the Department of Agriculture and 
Cooperation (MANAGE, 2000, 1'. 7)  
Besley and Bu~.gt?ss's (1000) s~ilcly ilsitty data from sixteeti main Indian states 
fiom 1958 to 1992 find that 
"our main tindiny is that tlrere is a rob~~st  link between land reform and 
poverty reduction. Closer scrutiny revels t h i \ t ,  in iiti Indian context, this is primarily 
due to land reforms that chaoge the trrrlls ut' the land contracts rather than actually 
redistributing land. Cor~kstait witti the alui-puverty ill~puct we tind that land reform 
haa r&isMf agricultural wages" (y. 3 0 3 )  and "overall these results suggest that k' 
faqmt on pewarrfi wmes n~aitlly through sefornls that affect produdion  relation^, 
&a than by elzwing the distribution of laad" (ihid, p. 419). It is armd thrt ti&@ 
benefits in land reform tlierefore Iiuve largely been due to ret'orm in the tenancy 
contractual relations and the rise in iiyric~~lt ural wayes. 
There have been major design tla~vs i n  the legislation as well, in Madhya 
Pradesh, the ceiling have been legislated at it higher limit, 10.12 hectares (from 1960- 
1972) and in tlie band o f 4  05 to 21 85 hecti11.e~ alter 1972 according to the Ceilings 
on Agricultural Holdings Act of I900 Alillouyli. Ieasi~ig is prohibited under the Land 
Revenue Code of 1960, (the evidence ot' its cxisierlce is established with additional 
recent empirical evidence), the et'tkut ot'tlle Ieyislt~tio~i lias only made the contractual 
arrangements more exploititiive \viili tlie erllergence of the 20 80 and 33:66 contract 
replacing the more conimon and 11iot.e eilt~itable 50.50 contract, tenure security has 
became shoner. Tlie lack of inlpletnelltation of the land ceilings act has only 
maintained the inequality in land Iloldiny and due to greater demand for leased-in 
land. Due to low wages and lessel availability of labour in  tlie lean seasons, the 
labour-locking of the laridless atid the stlli~ll a~id nlitrginal t'iirniers due to the share 
cropping contract lias bee11 riiai~iiai~led a ~ ~ d  the exploitative 20:80 contract has 
emerged as a newer form of exl~luitutio~~ ol' narginal t'ilrniers arid landless labourers. 
Cominenti~~y on rvladliya Pr.atleali Bealey snd Burges (2000) opine that 
"implementation of retb1.111 (is) rnrt'ticicnt, wir reason being that the sharecroppers 
and tenants are not recc~~.tled" (11 .30')) \vl\icll is cii~e to the lack of political and 
administrative will. Tlier~eti)l.e i l l  (he citse ut' kli~clliya I'radesh neither has the reforms 
in land redistribution nur tenaltcy 1eti>1.111s have been beneficial, due to design flaws 
and lack of political and adriiinis~~.i~iive will in tlieir iniplementi~tion. 
The recent policy i~iitia~ives ol'il~e (jovernnient of India on land reforms is in 
contrast to the earlier leyislatior~s The new dritH ~lntional agricult~~ral policy states that 
its approach on land ~.efor.nls will lbci~s on 'developnient of lease market for 
increasing the size of lloldings and by nlnliiny legal provision tbr giving private lands 
on lease for ct~ltivatior~ tuid agri-busi~ress". It also advocates that, 'private sector' 
participation will be proti~oted throuyll contract f'arming and land leasing 
arrangements to allow accelerated teclinoloyy transfer, capital inflow and assured 
market for crop produutioti, asprcinlly oil seeds, cotton and ho1~ticultura1 crops' (cited ' 
by Sswtena, 2000). To becl~nie niore 1)rotiucrive srld cori~petitive in the oil seed sector, 
pmticutady in the case OF paltnoleiti. Gtllitii (1000). cutrsider the possibility of  freeing 
it from the land ceiliriy act and i~lvite I i~~,ye-~c?~le  invest~ne~~t in his sector by the 
corporate world. 
A recent discussion pitpel. of tlie I'lan~ii~ig C'ommission, Saxena (2000) argues 
for open leasing in 'developeti' tt_yl.ici~ltu~~al 111itrkets wlrich it is argued would help the 
share croppers to yet better relits I t  is s~~ygested that the selective open leasing be 
implemented in a pilot niotie 111 selected d~str.icts and calls for t l~e enforcement of the 
existing rigorously in 'undevelol)ed oio~.kets' even when niaintaining that the 
bureaucracy is corrupt and nut interested in entbrcement of the laws. As argued 
rightly by Mearns (I908 36) " ~ t n t i l l  111i11.kets ;\re an important means by which poor 
gain access to land However de~.eyi~lat~on ot'~.ental nlarkets will benefit the poor only 
when there is a credible th~eat ~ ) f  cc~liny\ ctll\~~.ce~iient uud where there is possibility 
of clearly defined arid e~lfi)rcei\ble c < ) I I ~ ~ ~ \ c I \ "  
A radical suyycstron is illso pirt ti~rtll by DI. Saxella that 'unless the land 
hunger of the poor is mobilised into a ~i~ilitallt movement to neutralize the property 
instinct of the rich t3lrlnt.r~. long-term becirrity in law to tenants does not seem to be 
feasible' (P. 4). Tlie way 1br~~11.d  is the ~ieetl tbr political and administrative will to 
reform, the design flaws i r ~  laws, relbrlli the bu~eitucracy and take proactive steps in 
enforcement of Imid ce~li~lyb n11d i~~rti i~te tellallcy I-etb1.111 nieasures. The Madhya 
Pradesh Ceilings on Agr~culturi~l li~nd I-loldir~gs Act fix the ceiling at 7 hectares for 
Irrigable land. which is at ;t Iiiglle~ limit, the c~~tbrce~ilent is weak even of this limit. 
The prohibition of leasilly 11'1s only 111i1de tr~la~icy to go underground and the study has 
pointed out to the exploitative C L ) I I L I ; I C ~ S  t l ~ i l t  have arisen in  the ri~ral areas (33:66 and 
20:80 crop sharing contracls e~~lers i~lg  i\S t lie widel y fi)llowed than the earlier, more 
equitable 50:SO cunt~.i~ctb) I t '  c q ~ ~ ~ t i ~ b l e  ilevcIol)~lletlt hi~s ti) be achieved land and 
tenancy reforms needs to be give11 I I I I I I O S I  ~ I ~ ~ ~ c ) I . I ; ~ I I C ~ :  by the politicians, policy 
makers and bureaucrats i n  h/l;ldliya IJl.i~desll. Tlie success achieved by the Rajiv 
Gandhi Watershed Mission i ~ i  drvrlopi~ig \~i~te~.slleds since I996 have to be viewed 
with caution and it is inlpo~tant to u~~de~ 's t i~~ld  t le eclility of the distribution of benefits 
among the far~nel-s, tellarrts and the Ii~ndiess liiboiirers. 
If the above reti>rn~s do not see~n to be realistic in the liberaliscd pro-markkt 
agenda prevailing in the country, with tlio legislative body cor~rprising of tho !and 
holding class inhibiting reti>rms, the nc-westion of radical revolt by Dr. Saxena ( 2 0  
of the Planning Cornmissio~l is \v1~1-111 ~011siderillg by  tlie various stakeholders in the 
country. 
The banning of leiisins occordi~iy 111 the Land Revenue Code, 1960 has been 
unsuccessful, and the Madliya IJradesll t-luntiln Developtilent Report, 1998 Frankly 
admits that in Vidisha District, more than 70% of the land holdings are leased-in 
holdings. Share Cropping and Teni111cy shonld be accepted as a reality, and tenancy 
reform measures needed to be i~itroduced o ~ i  the coritractl~al terms. Such reform is 
possible, if the political and administrativt: will is there. The proactive policy of the 
current government pt.ovides iln oppolti~nity for the politicians, policy makers and 
bureaucrats to initiate changes ill the legislation and cortcurrently work with 
bureaucracy to ensure i~nplementation ut' tlie legislation. The machinery instituted 
under the Rajiv Gatidlli Wi~rel~shcd Missiorl. which has proactively worked in 
implementing progran~~iles. coultl be i~srd 11, i~ct as ciitnlysts of change in the mission 
mould. 
ICRISAT i n  its i~rte~.ve~~t io11 ill Lalati)r.t~ village during tlie 1999 rainy season 
has facilitated in the pr.on1otion ot' bttttes i ~ l l ~ i ~ t  psactices by the usage of Thiram, 
Potash and Urea and the yield ot'tlle t r iu l  fi~r~iiers ha been lliglier by 52.77% at 1.1, t 
ha" than other study villi~gus which had an average yield of 0.72 t hae'. The 
suggestions for fi~ti~re i~ttervcntio~i are. 
I .  The trial tlu11ia.s in Lalatoru villages were selected on technical 
considerations  ti^ ~~loilito~.ing tire Iun ot'fofsoil and water. However these 
landlords ore eliyrtyecl i l l  the exploitiitive shtire csoppiny 20:80 contract 
with the teli;1lits c)l'tlte tl.ibi~l Il;i~i~lct actjoining the villaye. It is suggested 
t11at filture interventio~i s~rutegicb, slloirltl be sensitive to the equity aspects 
and the trial fi1r11tel.s slioi~lri be clii)sen Small arid marginal farmers along 
with share cr.opl>ers with own land holding coiild be selected in t h i  
watershed villages wit11 due consideration of the technical Factors. 
2. Soybean is predo~ninall~ly ~ I . C ) \ Y I I  ill lrriyitble nrea, while most of the dry 
land is let1 i~ncultivated dul.ili% the iqainy season. ICRISAT could 
develop/evaluate and promote ctticient rainwater management and input 
practices so that the dry land fiir111er's risk coi~ld be reduced in cultivating 
soybean in the dry land 
3. Waterlogging remilins a 111iljo1. pl-o0lrm in  this region, which is one of the 
significant causes oru~idcr irlvcst~rre~rt of i11l111ts dire to the risk-aversion of 
the t'armers. Tccllnici~l solutio~~s to this problem have to found and this has 
to be done in a pn~.ticipittury rnotle with the t i~r~ner so that adoption takes 
place. 
4. BAIF's and ICRISAT'S ititel-veutions i l l  the demonstration watershed area 
are considered by tlie thl.~riers as it subsidised slipply of inputs and not as a 
research intw-vention to iriipl-ove yields. It is suggested that the future 
strategy sl~ui~lcl i ivulve tlre cllitrying of tlre i ~ i p i ~ t  costs. at least to the 
extent of 50% with tlie rest of i t  being treated as a loan. 
5. A strategy needs to be ti,r~rii~lated tbr disse~ninatio~i of input practices in 
the trial villages and other villityes. A si~ccessfi~l intervention in itself 
could create a tlc~i~ntlst~.;l~iw clli.ct to a . it'the inlsuts iire easily accessible 
at tlie local ~llarke~s. this 11eet1s to be si~pl>lcnre~rted by a pro-active strategy 
of disseniiniitio~i. 
6 .  There is need for greater pa~rncrsl~ip with Socio-Economic Policy Program 
(SEPP) of ICRISAT f~w the ~iati~ral resource ~nanayement strategies to 
examine the equity slid ellicirlrcy trspects of the intervention. 
BAlF needs to play ii pronctive role in the selection of the trial farmers and 
develop a strategy for di~~e~t~irli~til>tr ul' input practices itrnong farmers. The 
strengtheniny aud linki 113 of tlie d01.11li111t Sell' Iielp Groups with rural banks needs to 
be initiated and the rece~rtly initiated Swayiim Siddha Pluject gives an opportunity. 
There is need to develop it proyralnlne to reach out to landless share c r o p p q  
picularly those who enter illto the nrore esploitative 20:80 share cropping wntrad. 
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